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Introduction 
 
This article compares two recent analyses of continuity and change in the American 
power structure since 1900, with a focus on the postwar decades and the years between 1990 and 
2010. The first analysis defines the “corporate elite” as a subset of top executives and directors in 
the Fortune 1000, which was unified, moderate, and pragmatic in the postwar era (Mizruchi, 
2013, pp. 12-13). It further claims that the corporate elite has been fracturing and fragmenting in 
recent decades due to its decisive triumphs in the 1970s and 1980s, which made cohesion less 
necessary. Although corporations remain the most powerful organizations in the United States, 
their leaders are too divided and concerned with their own companies to contribute to the 
common good, as they once did (e.g., Mizruchi, 2013, pp. 4, 7, 17, 197). The loss of a united and 
moderate corporate elite is a “significant source of the current crisis in American democracy and 
a major cause of the predicament in which the twenty-first century United States finds itself” 
(Mizruchi, 2013, p. 4).  
The alternative view, called corporate-dominance theory in some books and in this 
article, claims that the United States continues to be dominated by the owners and top-level 
executives in corporations, banks, agribusinesses, and commercial real estate.1 “Domination” is 
defined as “the institutionalized outcome of great distributive power,” which is in turn defined as 
the ability “to establish the organizations, rules, and customs through which everyday life is 
conducted” (Domhoff, 2014b, p. 192). Methodologically, great distributive power is understood 
as an underlying “trait” or “property” of a collectivity called the “corporate community,” which 
includes all the financial companies and other corporations that are linked by common ownership 
or interlocking directorates. Research is carried out by means of a series of if-then statements 
using as many independent power indicators as possible (Lazarsfeld, 1966). These power 
indicators include various benefit distributions (e.g., the wealth and income distributions), 
overrepresentation in government positions, and success in specific policy and legislative 
arguments (Domhoff, 1983, pp. 10-13; 2014b, pp. 4-8).    
In this theory, corporate domination is maintained through a leadership group called ‘the 
power elite,” defined as those people who serve as directors or trustees in profit and nonprofit 
institutions controlled by the corporate community. This control is exercised through stock 
ownership, financial support, involvement on the board of directors, or some combination of 
these factors (Domhoff, 2014b, pp. 104-105). The power elite has moderately conservative and 
ultraconservative policy leanings within it, as indexed by the policy preferences expressed by 
specific organizations; however, some large corporations have directorships in both moderate 
and ultraconservative policy-discussion organizations (e.g., Domhoff, 1967, p. 28; 1990, pp. 35-
37; 2014b, pp. 17-18, 75-76). This view was developed on the basis of the systematic reading of 
business magazines by C. Wright Mills (Domhoff, 1990, pp. 32-37; Mills, 1948, pp. 25-30, 240-
250, 280-281), not on the basis of claims about corporate liberals by one subset of 1960s 
historians (e.g., Weinstein, 1968). 
 According to the fractured-elite analysis, three factors contributed to the corporate elite’s 
cohesion and moderation in the post-World War II era that stretched from the mid-1940s to the 
                                                 
1
 The theory is called “class-dominance theory” in books and articles that bring the social upper class into the picture 
(e.g., Domhoff, 2014b, Chapter 3).  
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mid-1970s, at which point the corporate elite made a more conservative turn: (1) an activist 
federal government that was able to regulate the economy to maintain high levels of employment 
and an adequate safety net; (2) the challenges from a strong union movement, which was able to 
negotiate a capital-labor accord that led to higher wages, greater social benefits, and increasing 
income equality; and (3) a handful of large commercial banks, whose boards of directors were 
able to create cohesion among various types of corporations because of their network centrality, 
depth of information, and wider business outlook (Mizruchi, 2013, pp. 4, 6-10).  
On the other hand, the corporate-dominance view argues that common interests, common 
opponents (not just unions), social interactions in exclusive settings, and meetings within policy-
discussion groups lead to both social and policy cohesion, with social cohesion contributing to 
the ability to create policy cohesion. Further, there never was a capital-labor accord because 
corporations never stopped trying to eliminate unions, and the federal government was 
constrained on all but a few pieces of employment and social-benefits legislation in the postwar 
era by the corporate community in general. This corporate constraint was exercised in good part 
through its electoral support for, and close ties to, the conservative coalition in Congress, which 
consisted of a majority of Southern Democrats and a majority of Republicans voting against a 
majority of non-Southern Democrats from the late 1930s to the mid-1990s (Manley, 1973; 
Shelley, 1983).  
In addition, corporate-dominance theory claims that a corporate-supported policy-
planning network formulated and lobbied for the many pro-corporate government policies that 
were implemented between 1910 and 2010, not the boards of directors of banks. According to 
this perspective, the power elite is at least as unified and powerful since 1980 as in the past, as 
indexed by the decline in union density, the increasing concentration of the income distribution, 
and most important of all in terms of this article, their ability to achieve their policy goals— 
eliminate the remaining union presence, extend international trade and continue the movement of 
production to low-wage countries when useful, reduce their personal income taxes and corporate 
taxes, and limit government programs for retirees and low-income workers. 
The fractured-elite perspective is presented in a recent book, one that provides far more 
than a theoretical analysis. It is a call to the corporate elite by its author, sociologist Mark 
Mizruchi (2013, pp. 286), “to save the world as we know it,” which is claimed to be necessary 
because there is not enough time remaining to create a strong social movement to force the 
corporate elite to make the needed changes. The first page of the Preface praises the corporate 
elite for its earlier “moderate and pragmatic approach that helped the society to prosper, both 
economically and politically,” but criticizes it for an “abdication of responsibility” since the 
1980s (Mizruchi, 2013, p. xi). It chastises the corporate leaders for allowing themselves to be 
“bullied and cowed” by right-wing extremists, and for being “ineffectual” and self interested 
(Mizruchi, 2013, pp, 265-266). It claims that the corporate elite is “leading us toward the fate of 
the earlier Roman, Dutch, and Habsburg Spanish Empires” by “starving the treasury and 
accumulating vast resources for itself” (Mizruchi, 2013, p. 286). Mizruchi’s book (2013, p. 286) 
concludes with the admonition that “It is long past time for its members to exercise some 
enlightened self-interest in the present.”  
On the other hand, there are few or no criticisms of corporate leaders in the books that 
present the corporate-dominance perspective. Instead, these books are concerned with 
understanding the nature and operation of power within the overall social structure, not only with 
the impact of the power elite on American society (e.g., Domhoff, 1967, p. 151). To the degree 
that there are criticisms in the work that presents the corporate-dominance perspective, they are 
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usually if not always based on analytical comparisons of corporate-dominance theory with 
alternative theories of power (Domhoff, 1970, Chapter 9; 1978, 1990, 1996, 2006a; 2014b, 
Chapter 9; Domhoff & Webber, 2011, Chapter 6; Gendron & Domhoff, 2009, Chapter 7).  
The analysis in this article follows the outline in the book on the fractured-elite 
perspective (Mizruchi, 2013). It begins with a discussion of the rise of corporate moderates 
between 1900 and the end of World War II because the fractured-elite theory’s 
misunderstandings of this time period lead it to an inadequate characterization of the postwar era. 
It then shows where and how the fractured-elite account goes wrong in its analysis of the three 
main topics it addresses for the postwar era: the role of the federal government, the impact of 
organized labor, and the policy influence of the members of the boards of commercial banks. It 
then presents evidence that the policy-planning network, which consists of nonprofit 
foundations, think tanks, and policy-discussion groups, and is financed and directed by corporate 
leaders, has a more important role in generating policy cohesion around common interests than 
do banks and their boards of directors. Finally, it examines several key policy issues that arose 
between 1990 and 2010 to demonstrate that the corporate elite continues to have a collective 
impact and is not fractured.  
 
The Rise of the Corporate Moderates, 1900-1945 
 
The fractured-elite and corporate-dominance perspectives both begin their analyses with 
the emergence of a group of moderate conservatives within the corporate community, which 
formed at the end of the nineteenth century after a massive merger and consolidation movement 
(e.g., Bunting, 1983, 1987; Roy, 1983, 1997). In 1900, the moderate conservatives created what 
proved to be the first of the national-level policy-discussion groups, the National Civic 
Federation (NCF) (Cyphers, 2002; Domhoff, 1970, pp, 163-170; Green, 1956; Jensen, 1956; 
Mizruchi, 2013, pp. 5, 27-31; Weinstein, 1968). According to the fractured-elite account, the 
NCF was created to deal with “some of the deleterious consequences of the rise of corporate 
capitalism at the turn of the twentieth century” (Mizruchi, 2013, p. 5), but it does not adequately 
characterize the context within which this organization developed or the full impact of its legacy 
in terms of the failed attempt by corporate moderates to minimize the clashes between 
corporations and unions during and after the New Deal.  
The NCF developed about midway in the short-lived “era of good feeling,” a period 
between roughly 1898 and 1903, in which corporate moderates, in conjunction with leaders from 
the American Federation of Labor (AFL), and with the advice of academic experts on labor 
issues, tried to reduce the recurrent management-labor conflicts through the use of “trade union 
agreements” (collective bargaining in today’s terms).  The NCF leaders became advocates of 
these agreements, and several were signed, but the agreements quickly broke down on both sides 
because some employers didn’t like the idea under the best of circumstances and the unions 
usually asked for more than they were offered after initial negotiations (Brody, 1980, pp. 24-27). 
For example, the National Metal Trades Association broke its agreement with the International 
Association of Machinists 13 months after signing it because the machinists tried to place limits 
on the number of apprentices in a shop and resisted piece rates and doubling up on machines 
(Swenson, 2002, pp. 49-52). The employers said in a Declaration of Principles that they would 
not "admit of any interference with the management of our business" (Brody, 1980, p. 25).  
The fractured-elite theory mischaracterizes the origins and nature of the National 
Association of Manufacturers (NAM), which is portrayed as an anti-union organization from its 
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outset (Mizruchi, 2013, pp. 27-29). It actually was founded in 1895 as part of an effort to expand 
foreign exports, not as a bulwark against unions.  Its first president, who joined the NCF when it 
was created, said that discussion of employer-employee relations was not one of the NAM’s 
“proper functions” (Weinstein, 1968, p. 15). However, toward the end of the era of good feeling, 
hard-line anti-union corporation leaders took over the NAM in 1902 in a three-way election for 
president, and it has been a bastion of anti-unionism ever since.  
After ignoring the era of good feeling, the fractured-elite viewpoint goes further astray by 
using an outdated journalistic source, Lewis Corey’s The House of Morgan (1931), to portray the 
most powerful banker of that era, J. P Morgan, as unwilling under any circumstances to settle a 
strike, which the leaders of the small union of skilled steel workers called shortly after Morgan 
merged several steel companies into U.S. Steel (Mizruchi, 2013, p. 27). However, historical 
accounts based on archival materials, including a summary of conversations within the executive 
committee that ran U.S. Steel at that time, tell a different story.  The union would not even 
consider the terms offered to them by Morgan, who wanted to avoid public controversy about the 
new company as well as possible government investigations of it. He therefore “assured the 
union leaders that he wished to maintain friendly relations with labor” (Garraty, 1960, p. 13). 
Instead, the union leaders broke existing contracts and tried to extend the strike to skilled 
workers in all the subsidiaries of the new company, most of which had never been unionized.  In 
the process, the steel union leaders deeply angered the president of the AFL, Samuel Gompers, 
who had good information on Morgan’s intentions via intermediaries, and was highly critical of 
the union’s leadership in a federation newsletter (Gompers, 1901, p. 428). 
Morgan met with the union leaders again, offering to sign contracts in factories in which 
the skilled workers already had been unionized, but not in factories that did not have established 
locals of the union (Neill, 1913, p. 506). However, his offer was rejected, and he then gave the 
order to break the strike. Even then, Morgan allowed the declining union to persist until 1909 
despite its resistance to new technologies and the continuing insistence by the staunchly anti-
union presidents of the many U.S. Steel subsidiaries that it should be crushed immediately 
(Garraty, 1960, p. 26). Contrary to the fractured-elite account, what happened between Morgan 
and the steel unions is an example of the mutual suspicions and recriminations that ended the era 
of good feeling.2 
Reflecting this renewed conflict between corporations and unions, by 1905 the NCF had 
focused its attention on trying to persuade all corporations to adopt various social-benefit 
programs, ranging from on-site technical education courses to recreational facilities, as a way to 
deal with worker discontent (Cyphers, 2002; Weinstein, 1968, pp. 19-20). However, it did not 
entirely abandon the concept of trade union agreements, which became one basis for the plans 
that corporate moderates put forth during the New Deal to cope with the increase in demands for 
union recognition (Domhoff, 1990, Chapter 4; Piven & Cloward, 1977, p. 110). From the 
corporate moderates’ point of view, collective bargaining held out the potential for satisfying the 
demands of the relatively small number of craft workers, while at the same time allowing them 
to oppose unions for the large number of unskilled workers. 
 
 
The New Deal 
 
                                                 
2
 My deepest thanks to historian Susie Pak of St. John’s University, an expert on J. P. Morgan and his banking 
interests (Pak, 2013), for the citations in this and the preceding paragraph. 
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 The brief discussion of the New Deal in the fractured-elite account falls short in 
important ways that distort its later discussions of the postwar stances of the corporate 
moderates. Its difficulties are encapsulated in its conclusion that a labor historian “may have 
been correct when he stated that ‘despite much wishful historiography to the contrary, no well-
organized ‘corporate liberal’ body of enlightened businessmen supported either the Wagner Act 
or the Social Security Act’” (Mizruchi, 2013, p. 110). The fractured-elite theory thereby misses 
the contrasts between the corporate moderates’ total opposition to the final version of the 
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) and their very large role in shaping and supporting those 
provisions of the Social Security Act (SSA) that mattered to them: pensions and unemployment 
benefits.  This contrast between the corporate moderates’ stance on the NLRA and SSA is crucial 
because there is actually an unbroken continuity on both of these issues from the mid-30s to the 
late 1970s, when the corporate moderates became extremely critical of any further growth in 
Social Security benefits and have remained so ever since (Domhoff, 2013, pp. 247-253).  
 
The Origins of the National Labor Relations Act 
 
Recent archival findings reveal how and why the most important corporate moderates of 
the 1930s came to be adamantly opposed to the final version of the NLRA, even though they 
suggested the creation of the original National Labor Board (NLB) to deal with the unanticipated 
union organizing drive that followed the passage of the National Industrial Recovery Act in 
1933; they also introduced several of the original labor board’s policies and procedures 
(Domhoff & Webber, 2011, Chapter 3; McQuaid, 1979). Thanks to the apparent success of the 
small handful of corporate-sponsored Employee Representation Plans initiated in the 1920s, 
which encouraged workers at individual work sites to meet and confer with management about 
working conditions, the corporate moderates thought they had little to fear from the few unions 
that remained after the corporate pushback following World War I. Moreover, an increasing 
number of large companies instituted such plans in 1933-1934 in response to urgent suggestions 
from the corporate leaders that helped in the establishment of the NLB.  However, because of 
problems in dealing with the many corporate employers that refused to accept the decisions of 
the NLB, especially in the automobile and steel industries, liberals in the Senate, led by Senator 
Robert F. Wagner of New York, and aided by the lawyers that worked for the NLB, fashioned 
new legislation. Among several pro-union amendments, it included a clause stating that a 
majority vote for a union would be sufficient for it to have the right to represent all workers in 
the bargaining unit. 
The corporate moderates objected to the new legislation for several reasons, including its 
threat to their Employee Representation Plans and its failure to ban coercion by union organizers 
as well as by corporations. From a corporate-dominance perspective, however, the corporate 
moderates most of all resisted on the issue of majority rule, which meant that Employee 
Representation plans would have to be closed down if the majority of those voting favored a 
union. They preferred an approach called “proportional representation “ which would allow 
Employee Representation Plans to coexist with unions, or make it possible to deal with craft 
workers separately from industrial workers if necessary (Domhoff & Webber, 2011, pp. 121-
125; Gross, 1974, pp. 57-58, 89-103, 136-139). Senator Wagner agreed to remove clauses that 
directly banned Employee Representation Plans, but he and several AFL leaders were no longer 
willing to accept proportional representation, as the union representatives had agreed to do 
during World War I as members of the temporary War Labor Board (McQuaid, 1979).  
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This change in position by liberal Democrats and organized labor led to an unbridgeable 
gulf between them and the corporate moderates, as revealed by correspondence between the head 
of General Electric and his counterparts at Standard Oil of New Jersey and the DuPont 
Corporation (Domhoff & Webber, 2011, pp. 119-124). In addition to being the top leaders at 
three of the largest corporations of that era, they were the three most important business 
executives in the pool of NLB business representatives that could hear the growing number of 
cases that came before the board.  
Senator Wagner’s new legislation was defeated in 1934, but it passed in 1935 despite a 
massive corporate campaign against it. This was first of all because the newly formed liberal-
labor alliance had a large majority in both houses due in part to labor militancy in 1933 and 
1934. In the final analysis, however, it passed because the Southern Democrats, who had the 
power to obstruct through their many reciprocal relationships with President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt, did not block it. They also had leverage through their control of a majority of key 
Congressional committees, which meant they could slow down or eliminate many of the 
recovery plans, and they resorted to filibusters whenever they thought the plantation capitalists’ 
insistence on subordinating African American workers and keeping out unions was in any way at 
risk.  
Any tension for Southern Democrats over supporting the labor act was resolved quickly 
because the liberal-labor leaders and the non-Southern Democrats in Congress continued to agree 
that any labor legislation would exclude agricultural workers and domestic servants. The 
evidence for this bargain between Northern and Southern Democrats has been carefully 
documented in what is a major contribution to the understanding of how this act could be passed 
in a corporate-dominated society (Farhang & Katznelson, 2005). In the aftermath of the passage 
of the NLRA, the corporate moderates decided to move ahead with their plan to challenge the 
constitutionality of the act, and ultimately lost in the Supreme Court in the spring of 1937 
(Domhoff & Webber, 2011, pp. 137, 196; Shamir, 1995). In addition, many corporations 
stockpiled guns and dynamite, hired labor spies to infiltrate union groups, and organized small 
groups to attack union activists, as revealed in Senate hearings in early 1937, which received 
wide publicity and made it difficult for corporations to implement their plans when the time 
came (Auerbach, 1966). 
Due to increased worker militancy, and aided by the refusal of the president and 
Democratic governors to send troops to break strikes in two or three large industrial states, union 
membership nearly tripled from 3.1 million in 1934 to 8.8 million in 1939, despite the anti-union 
efforts by both corporate moderates and ultraconservatives (Mayer, 2004, p. 23, Table A1). 
However, this burst of union organizing, which included sit-down strikes and attempts to 
organize bi-racial unions in the South, turned the Southern Democrats against the act by late 
1937, which united the conservative coalition against any further progress for unions (Gross, 
1981; Patterson, 1967). 
 
The Origins of the Social Security Act 
  
The fractured-elite view says very little about the origins of the SSA in its account of the 
corporate moderates during the New Deal. It discusses those researchers said to have a 
“business-centered model” (Domhoff, 1970, pp. 207-218; 1990, pp. 44-61; Quadagno, 1988) and 
compares them to those who have a “state-centered model” (Skocpol, 1980; Skocpol & Amenta, 
1985; Skocpol & Ikenberry, 1983). It gives a nod to the business-centered view by agreeing that 
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some corporate leaders were supportive of the act, but it does not try to assess their degree of 
influence. It then agrees with the state-centered model that “no list of individual business leaders, 
no matter how prominent, can serve as proof of general corporate support—or even the support 
of a class segment” (Mizruchi, 2013, p. 35). 
       In making this comment about lists of individual business leaders not being very important 
as evidence, the fractured-elite view overlooks the considerable evidence from the archival files 
of the Rockefeller Foundation and the Social Science Research Council showing that the 
corporate moderates formulated the basic plans for the SSA. They did so through their 
experience with private pension plans in their corporations in the 1920s and through meetings of 
the Special Conference Committee, a regular gathering of industrial relations vice presidents at 
the ten largest companies of that time. The Special Conference Committee in turn had 
considerable help from Industrial Relations Counselors, a mini-think tank privately funded from 
its founding in 1921 by John D. Rockefeller, Jr. (Domhoff, 1996, pp. 128-149; Gitelman, 1988). 
The corporate moderates then urged their plans for the old-age and unemployment provisions of 
the act upon Roosevelt’s Committee on Economic Security, which was staffed by university-
based experts and corporate employees (the latter in fair measure affiliated with Industrial 
Relations Counselors) (Domhoff, 1996, pp. 149-161; Witte, 1963, pp. 13-16, 29). They also had 
direct involvement in the development of the legislative proposal through committees of the 
Business Advisory Council, which was established by Roosevelt in 1933 as a means of formal 
communication with the leaders of the corporate community (Domhoff & Webber, 2011, pp. 
113-115). They also had a crucial role as members of the Advisory Committee on Economic 
Security, which consisted of 23 private citizens representing a wide range of organizations, 
including corporate moderates, union leaders, and social-welfare advocates (Armstrong, 1965, 
pp. 88-89; Brown, 1972, p. 21) 
This evidence was augmented by further research in the same archives and by the use of a 
series of little-known confidential corporate newsletters in which Industrial Relations Counselors 
provided behind-the-scenes commentary to its corporate clients about the progress of its plans 
through the legislative process (Domhoff & Webber, 2011, Chapter 4; Kaufman, 2003). This 
evidence is not about lists of names, but about the substance of policies and the role of corporate 
employees, some of them policy experts, in bringing about the passage of the act in a form that 
was satisfactory to the corporate moderates. The archival evidence and the newsletter show that 
the corporate plans and the final legislation match up well. To the degree that the act was not 
satisfactory to the corporate moderates, they worked very hard, and successfully, to modify it 
between 1937 and 1939, when important legislative amendments were enacted (Domhoff & 
Webber, 2011, Chapter 5).  
 However, to say that corporate moderates created the blueprint for the SSA does not 
mean that there was no conflict over the substance of the act. In fact, there was a rival pro-
business plan for unemployment insurance that had been fashioned over the decades by a small 
network of policy experts, lawyers, and business leaders. It centered on the work of institutional 
economist John R. Commons, who joined the department of economics at the University of 
Wisconsin in 1904 after two years as an employee dealing with labor issues for the NCF 
(Domhoff, 1990, p. 49). This network, which included Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis 
and Harvard Law School Professor Felix Frankfurter, believed (on the basis of many past 
failures) that progressive changes could only be implemented if they included strong incentives 
for at least some portion of the corporate community to support the reforms (Domhoff, 1996, pp. 
126-127, 170-172; Kessler-Harris, 2001, Chapter 3). 
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Moreover, the Southern Democrats once again had a veto power over any aspect of the 
act that did not fit the needs of plantation owners. This meant that there was little or no federal 
control over how the SSA was administered at the state level and that agricultural and domestic 
workers were excluded from its purview (Domhoff, 1990, p. 60; Quadagno, 1988, pp. 115-116, 
125-127, 187-188). From a corporate-dominance perspective, the group headed by John 
Commons and Louis Brandeis won out over the corporate moderates on these issues because the 
Southerners found its plans more compatible with their own concerns (Domhoff, 1996, pp. 172-
174; Domhoff & Webber, 2011, pp. 175-176). This point is best seen in the fact that the 
minimum state regulatory standards and minimum payments advocated by the Commons-
Brandeis group were not included in the final legislation. 
 It is also clear that organized labor had very little influence on the main outlines of the 
SSA, except for its important decision in 1932 to no longer oppose governmental social-benefit 
programs. As for the liberals of the day, their plans lost out. Due to their willingness to settle for 
the best possible legislation, along with their close ties to the president and his reformer wife, 
they lobbied strenuously for the corporate moderates’ plan (Gordon, 1994).  Overall, this brief 
recounting of the origins of the SSA demonstrates that corporate moderation on social-benefit 
issues was not a new development after World War II. For corporate moderates, social benefits 
are one thing, but labor unions are entirely another, a distinction that reaches back at least to the 
activities of the National Civic Federation. 
 
The Rise of Two Voting Coalitions in Congress 
 
The fractured-elite perspective on the postwar era also suffers because it does not discuss 
the emergence of the conservative coalition in Congress between 1937 and 1939 (Patterson, 
1967), which was informally coordinated by discussions between top Southern Democrats and 
Northern Republicans (Manley, 1973, for interview evidence of this coordination). It formed on 
four general issues that were of great concern to employers North and South, and which in 
essence defined the substance of class conflict in that era —labor unions, social welfare, 
government regulation of business, and civil rights in the South for African American workers. 
Moreover, it rarely lost on any of these issues until the 1965-1966 Congress (Shelley, 1983, pp. 
34, 39), and it never lost on labor legislation whatever the decade (Brady & Bullock, 1980; 
Katznelson, Geiger, & Kryder, 1993).  
Nor does the fractured-elite account include the spending coalition that also developed in 
the late 1930s, which is important for understanding most of the losses on legislative issues that 
were suffered by ultraconservatives in the corporate community in the postwar era. Southern 
Democrats wanted subsidies for plantation owners and urban machine Democrats in large 
Northern cities wanted subsidies for urban land and real estate interests, which supported urban 
renewal and housing; their mutual support for each other’s subsidies became the main axis of the 
spending coalition. Subsidies for urban growth also had the backing of the construction unions in 
the American Federation of Labor, which brought them into the coalition (Logan & Molotch, 
1987). The contingent of liberal Democrats in Congress also joined this coalition of mutual back-
scratching because of its desire to expand domestic spending that would benefit middle- and low-
income people and help labor unions (Clausen, 1973; Domhoff, 2013, pp. 15-17; Sinclair, 1982).  
By 1938, the conservative coalition had launched a serious challenge to the new National 
Labor Relations Board (NLRB), which led to a reduced budget for it and the replacement of its 
most liberal member by 1940 (Gross, 1981, p. 2 and Chapters 6-8). However, the effort to 
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cripple or dismantle the NLRB was delayed by the preparations for WWII. Nevertheless, by that 
point the conservative coalition had crafted a set of amendments to the NLRA; most of these 
amendments were enacted in 1947 as part of the Taft-Hartley Act, the first of several legislative 
setbacks for the fractured union movement in the postwar era (Gross, 1981, p. 3 and Chapters 5, 
10, and 13). Furthermore, total union membership declined by 46,000 in 1940, and union density 
(defined here as the percentage of nonagricultural workers in unions) declined from 28.6 in 1939 
to 26.9 percent in 1940 (Mayer, 2004, p. 23, Table A1).  
 And yet, from the fractured-elite perspective, corporations were slowly adapting at this 
time to the existence of unions: “By 1939, the essentials of a postwar ‘capital-labor’ accord were 
already in place, although they were interrupted by the war and a postwar surge of militancy” 
(Mizruchi, 2013, p. 87). This claim is based in part on a survey of corporate executives by 
Fortune in that year, which found that “only 41.7 percent” of them favored repeal of the National 
Labor Relations Act, with another 41.9 percent favoring modifications, and 3.7 percent believing 
it should remain as enacted (Mizruchi, 2013, p. 82). 
 
Corporate Planning On Foreign Policy  
 
The fractured-elite perspective on the postwar era is further limited by its overly brief 
treatment of the years shortly before and during American involvement in World War II. Its 
discussion of this crucial time period provides an inadequate account of the origins of the 
Committee for Economic Development (CED), a new corporate-moderate policy-discussion 
group that looms large in the fractured-elite analysis (Mizruchi, 2013, pp. 37-40). In the process, 
fractured-elite theory endorses a questionable claim by the treasurer of Eastman Kodak as to why 
corporate executives came to appreciate the role of government: their participation in it during 
the war taught them “what a tough job it is to run a government. So the businessmen got to 
appreciate the government and not be so critical of it” (Mizruchi, 2013, p. 42). In fact, the large-
scale involvement of corporate executives in the wartime mobilization was concerned with much 
more than learning to appreciate the government. Working closely with the conservative 
coalition, the corporate community as a whole ran the massive industrial defense mobilization 
from appointed positions in the Pentagon and as members of various presidentially appointed 
boards, and in the process achieved many victories over the liberal-labor alliance, including the 
defeat of the extensive liberal-labor postwar planning efforts and the disestablishment of several 
New Deal agencies (Domhoff, 1996, Chapter 6; Waddell, 2001).  
Most notable of all, the fractured-elite view does not discuss the central role of the 
corporate moderates in creating the plans for internationalizing the economy after the war. These 
plans provide another part of the context, along with the NLRA and the SSA, for understanding 
the postwar policy preferences of the corporate moderates. This initiative was sponsored by the 
Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), one the main corporate-moderate policy-discussion groups 
since its founding in 1921 (Schulzinger, 1984; Shoup, 1974, 1975). Shortly after World War II 
began in September 1939, the CFR created a program called the War-Peace Studies with the 
approval of the State Department and a large grant from the Rockefeller Foundation (Domhoff, 
2014a).  
Working through separate study groups, it then brought together several hundred business 
and financial leaders, academic experts, and former government officials to search for consensus 
for a postwar vision of the national interest. In the long run, the Economic and Financial Group 
was the most important of these committees because it developed the proposals that became the 
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framework for American foreign and economic policies. By the summer of 1940, the Economic 
and Financial Group had concluded that the full productivity of the American economy as then 
constituted could only be realized if corporations were able to invest, purchase raw materials, 
and sell products in an area that included Western Europe, South America, and the British 
Empire, an area that came to be defined as the “Grand Area.”  The Grand Area strategy also 
included Southeast Asia because of the need for nearby trading partners for Japan and raw 
materials for industrialized countries. The War-Peace Studies also argued for the necessity of an 
International Monetary Fund and an International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(Domhoff, 1990, Chapters 4 and 5; 2014a; Shoup & Minter, 1977). In terms of the postwar 
conflicts between the corporate community and the liberal-labor alliance, the Economic and 
Financial Group provided an alternative that helped make it possible to overcome the liberal-
labor alliance’s desire for a more government-directed economy.  
 
The CED and Corporate Successes During World War II 
 
There were limits to the usefulness of the CFR planning effort because it did not include 
the many corporations that would not be involved in foreign trade in the first several years after 
the war, if ever. Nor did its behind-the-scenes planning in close coordination with the 
departments of state and treasury do anything to counter the highly visible postwar planning that 
was being carried out by experts in the liberal-labor alliance. Working in and around the National 
Resources Planning Board, a small government agency within the White House, the alliances’ 
experts were making use of liberal and left Keynesian prescriptions that called for continued 
government spending and new planning agencies. These liberal-labor plans would perforce limit 
the power of corporations and make foreign markets less important in avoiding a return of the 
depression-level economic conditions that did not abate until World War II spending began. 
It was in this context that the CED was created in 1942 to the displeasure of President 
Roosevelt (Domhoff, 2013, pp. 31-34; Waddell, 2001, pp. 136, 197n. 46). In effect, the goal set 
for the CED by its founders, a majority of whom were members of the Business Advisory 
Council, was to fashion a set of policies that would insure that the Great Depression did not 
return. These policy preferences came to be known as “business” or “commercial” Keynesianism 
(Collins, 1981). The details of the CED’s disagreements with the liberal and left Keynesian 
perspectives will be explained in the context of discussing the weaknesses of the fractured-elite 
analysis of postwar government involvement in the economy.  
In addition to establishing several committees to carry out its mandate, one of the CED’s 
founding trustees joined the CFR’s War-Peace Studies as a member of the Economic and 
Financial Group. The CFR-CED overlap (five of the 11 members of the CED’s crucial Research 
Committee were also members of the CFR) was supplemented when four of the most 
experienced economists advising the CFR’s Economic and Financial Group were hired to consult 
for the CED as well. Complementing the CFR’s international planning, the CED’s committee on 
international trade policy made important additions to the corporate moderates’ understanding of 
how to create a strong international economic system; in particular, the CED committee showed 
that international trade could not by itself lead to adequate demand, contrary to what most 
bankers, many non-Keynesian economists, and Roosevelt’s secretary of state believed. Instead, 
increased international trade depended on the creation of strong domestic consumer demand 
(Domhoff, 2013, p. 49; Whitham, 2010a, 2010b). This new economic understanding, overlooked 
in the fractured-elite perspective, is another reason why the postwar corporate moderates were 
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more supportive of some postwar spending and planning initiatives, such as the Employment Act 
of 1946, than they otherwise might have been (Domhoff, 1990, Chapter 7).  
Moreover, the CED trustees became the most visible postwar advocates (through nine 
published and well-publicized policy statements, regional forums, testimony before Congress, 
and appointments to government positions) for lower tariffs and formal international trade 
organizations, to the annoyance of most ultraconservatives.  After being blocked in its efforts 
during the Eisenhower era by the NAM and the Chamber of Commerce, which usually found 
more favor with the conservative coalition than did the corporate moderates on this issue, the 
CED enjoyed its greatest successes on trade expansion in the 1960s and 1970s, creating the 
framework that became the foundation for the larger degree of internationalization that led to a 
global economy (Domhoff, 1990, Chapter 8; 2014a; Dreiling & Darves, 2011; Dreiling & 
Darves-Bornoz, 2015).   
The CED, working even more closely with the CFR by this point, and sharing more 
trustees and members with it, became involved in postwar foreign and defense policies as well. 
In 1946 the two organizations urged the White House and Congress to provide massive aid to 
economically debilitated European countries, at least two of which had strong Communist parties 
that greatly concerned corporate moderates (CED, 1947a; Eakins, 1969; Hogan, 1987). They 
then provided the majority of the members of a blue-ribbon presidential commission to study the 
problem, and also had a hand in convincing ultraconservatives in Congress and the general 
public to accept the plan through a highly visible citizens’ committee established by CFR leaders 
(Wala, 1994, pp. 181-214).  
As foreign policy leaders became more fully convinced between 1947 and 1948 that the 
intentions of the Soviet Union were antithetical to American interests, the CFR and its many 
members in the State Department, including the corporate lawyer who was serving as Secretary 
of State, began thinking in terms of a substantial military build-up in Western Europe.  When the 
Soviets successfully tested an atomic bomb in August 1949, and the anticipated communist 
victory occurred in China a month later, President Harry S. Truman, despite previous hesitations, 
agreed to a major reevaluation of the country’s foreign and military policies. The result was a 
new national security policy statement, “United States Objectives and Programs for National 
Security” (NSC-68), which recommended a 300 percent increase in military spending over the 
next few years to rearm Western Europe and station 100,000 American troops there as well 
(Domhoff, 2013, pp. 75-76; Friedberg, 2000; Huntington, 1961; Nitze, 1980). To deal with the 
financial and military doubts expressed by ultraconservative Republicans in Congress, the 
corporate moderates created a new lobbying and opinion-shaping organization in early 1950, the 
Committee on the Present Danger, which included numerous members of the CED and CFR 
among its 54 members. After the Korean War unexpectedly broke out about five months later, 
the corporate moderates were able to achieve their goal when Congress eventually agreed to a 
major increase in defense spending for the purpose of defending Europe (Friedberg, 2000; 
Sanders, 1983).  
As this brief overview of CED and CFR involvement in postwar foreign and defense 
policy implies, internationalizing the economy and containing the perceived Soviet threat are an 
integral part of the context for understanding the domestic postwar policy issues that are 
discussed in the fractured-elite analysis. This context is largely ignored in the fractured-elite 
perspective. 
 
Moderate Conservatives and Ultraconservatives in the Postwar Era 
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The fractured-elite account of domestic policy during the postwar era is inadequate for 
five reasons.   First, it does not discuss the mixture of cooperation and disagreement between the 
moderate conservatives and the ultraconservatives, which varied along several dimensions.  
Second it does not explain the exact nature of the government interventions into the economy 
that were acceptable to the corporate moderates, nor the way in which those interventions 
differed from those favored by the liberal-labor alliance. Third, it does not understand that the 
moderate conservatives were fully opposed to the labor movement, which is mischaracterized as 
“growing and increasingly strong” between 1945 and approximately 1973 (Mizruchi, 2013, p. 
45). Fourth, it ignores the crucial role of the conservative coalition in Congress in securing the 
interests of the corporate community. Fifth, it wrongly argues that corporate leaders, in their 
roles as bank directors, were important in generating agreement among corporate moderates on 
major policy issues, when in fact it is corporate leaders who are part of the policy-planning 
network that have an impact on the public policies of concern to them. 
 
Moderate-Conservative and Ultraconservative Policy Preferences 
 
Although corporate moderates and ultraconservatives have several policy differences, 
they also share several policy preferences as well. First and foremost, they are fully united in all-
out opposition to organized labor at the legislative and judicial levels, and in the workplace 
whenever possible. Corporate moderates and ultraconservatives also share the view that taxes on 
large personal incomes and corporations have been too high since the end of World War II, while 
at the same time disagreeing on the relative importance they would put on income taxes and sales 
taxes, with corporate moderates seeing sales taxes as too regressive and a drag on consumer 
spending (Domhoff, 2013, pp. 43-48). In addition, both moderates and ultraconservatives strive 
to keep government regulation to a minimum, although they sometimes disagree on how to 
achieve this shared goal.  
Within the context of these common views on critical issues, the differences between 
moderates and ultraconservatives in the corporate community are relatively minor in terms of the 
overall power structure. They are nonetheless the occasion of major battles, and in the 1950s and 
early 1960s they were emphasized by social scientists and historians who opposed any type of 
class-based theory of power. The nature of these differences in the postwar era was first 
demonstrated in a rigorous way through a content analysis of all available publications, media 
advertisements, and radio commercials financed by corporations and their related business 
associations between July 1 1948, and June 30 1949. The researchers found a majority “classical 
creed” that was embodied by the Chamber of Commerce and the NAM, and then identified the 
corporate moderates as those who believed that the “system does not function perfectly,” making 
it necessary to adopt some Keynesian ideas and use government to introduce the necessary 
corrections (Sutton, Harris, Kaysen, & Tobin, 1956, pp. 215-216). These findings on the main 
policy divisions within the corporate community were reinforced by the results of a 1959 mail 
survey of corporate executives’ perspectives on several domestic and foreign-policy issues, 
which found large differences between members of the NAM and CED (Woodhouse & 
McLellan, 1966).   
 The differences between the moderate conservatives and the ultraconservatives can be 
seen in more detail in a study of 107 pieces of new Congressional legislation (passed between 
1953 and 1987) that were judged to be important by a Congressional scholar in political science 
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(Mayhew, 1991/2005). Another political scientist then analyzed these legislative enactments in 
terms of the positions taken on them by the Chamber of Commerce (Smith, 2000). The Chamber 
was on the winning side on just under half of the issues, which were also supported for the most 
part by corporate moderates. However, the fact that the Chamber was on the losing side just over 
half the time makes its 56 losses of considerable interest. It is noteworthy that most of these 
losses occurred because other segments of the ownership class favored the legislation, but there 
were some victories for the liberal-labor alliance as well.  
For example, the Chamber often lost to the well-organized urban landowners and 
commercial developers on issues concerning subsidies for urban renewal and downtown growth. 
In addition to support from the spending coalition, the urban growth coalitions had the backing 
of corporate moderates on these issues, as shown in CED reports from the late 1950s through the 
early 1980s (Domhoff, 2013, pp. 116-120, 258). Strikingly, the fractured-elite perspective 
overlooks the power of the landowners and developers when it uses corporate-moderate support 
for President Lyndon Johnson’s Model Cities program as evidence that corporate moderates had 
“a sense of responsibility for the larger society” and “were willing to support a significant liberal 
social program that provided no clear immediate benefits” (Mizruchi, 2013, pp. 68, 171). 
 Contrary to this claim, the several CED policy statements related to urban policies show 
clearly that its goal was to support the continuance of the urban renewal program in the face of 
strong challenges from inner-city neighborhoods and liberal critics. Due to major changes that 
the Republicans enacted when they captured control of Congress in 1954, the Housing Act of 
1949 was transformed from a liberal-oriented “urban redevelopment” program primarily focused 
on housing into an “urban renewal” program that provided huge economic benefits for big 
commercial real estate firms and developers. They could now acquire downtown land at a 
bargain price once the low-income people on that land, a large percentage of whom were African 
Americans, were removed from it (Domhoff, 2005; 2013, pp. 80, 117-120).  Urban renewal was 
also of great interest to large universities, such as Yale and the University of Chicago, which felt 
encircled by low-income African-American communities and at the same time wanted the land 
they were on for university expansion. All of these universities, but perhaps most of all Yale and 
the University of Chicago, included several corporate moderates among their trustees (Domhoff, 
1978, Chapter 3; Rossi & Dentler, 1961). Thus, contrary to the fractured-elite perspective, the 
Model Cities Program was not a liberal program (Domhoff, 2013, pp. 135-137; Frieden & 
Kaplan, 1975, pp. 259, 261, 264-265; Quadagno, 1994, Chapter 4).  
Just as the anti-subsidy Chamber lost to urban land interests, so too did it lose to 
agribusiness interests on several votes concerning the agricultural subsidies that are vital to large 
agribusiness interests, starting with the Southern plantation owners, who were among the major 
backers and beneficiaries of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 (Domhoff & Webber, 
2011, Chapter 3).  The Chamber also lost to temporary coalitions of corporate moderates and the 
liberal-labor alliance in 1958, 1963, 1965, and 1972 on programs that provided federal aid to 
universities for the support of basic research in science and engineering and to public schools in 
depressed areas. In addition, the Chamber was defeated on several votes that involved changes in 
the Social Security program, such as increased benefit payments, the inclusion of more 
occupational categories, and adding disability benefits, most of which were favored by corporate 
moderates, as might be expected from their involvement in the creation of the Social Security 
Act.  Finally, the Chamber lost to the liberal-labor alliance on several types of legislation that 
benefited low-income and unemployed people by raising the minimum wage, extending or 
increasing unemployment benefits, and providing rent support. While these liberal-labor 
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victories were important to workers in keeping even with or getting ahead of inflation, they were 
for the most part additions or augmentations to earlier legislation. 
Overall, then, the context and substance of power conflicts in the postwar era were far 
different from the way they are portrayed by fractured-elite theory. In retrospect, this era was a 
time of greater income equality than from the 1970s to the present, due at least in part to the 
strength of the construction and industrial unions, but it was also a time in which the liberal-labor 
alliance lost every major legislative power struggle in which it engaged, with the important 
exception of the Medicare Act of 1965 (Domhoff, 2013, pp. 129-134; Quadagno, 2005, Chapter 
5).  
 
The Corporate Moderates and the Postwar Economy 
  
The fractured-elite perspective stresses that the corporate moderates accepted the idea 
that there had to be more government involvement in the economy than ultraconservatives 
believed was necessary, including an expansion of Social Security and the use of deficit 
spending (Mizruchi, 2013, pp. 5, 51-52, 57). However, it does not discuss the crucial differences 
between the way in which the corporate moderates and the liberal-labor alliance wanted to 
manage the economy, thereby overlooking the class conflict that played out within government 
on key economic issues. The corporate moderates were for very specific kinds of government 
involvement, and they largely succeeded in having their way. This point is best demonstrated by 
the way in which the corporate moderates disagreed with both the ultraconservatives and the 
liberal-labor alliance on fiscal and monetary policy.  In other words, there were acceptable and 
unacceptable versions of Keynesianism as far as the corporate moderates were concerned. It is 
on this point that CED policy statements and archival files provide a very good window into the 
mindset of the corporate moderates as to what they thought was at stake. 
Although CED trustees had crafted their own version of Keynesianism by 1943-1944, 
their views are best articulated in two policy statements that were published after the war ended. 
The first of the two, Taxes and the Budget: A Program for Prosperity in a Free Economy 
(1947c) created a halfway position between the ultraconservatives, who wanted balanced 
budgets, and the liberal and left Keynesians, who wanted to manage future economic downturns 
through tax cuts for low- and middle-income workers, increases in government spending, and the 
provision of government jobs. In addition, the liberal Keynesians wanted to head off periods of 
demand-pull inflation by raising taxes on the well-to-do and cutting government expenditures, 
which would decrease buying power and at the same time perhaps provide enough of a 
government surplus to pay down the federal debt. CED trustees opposed all of these liberal-labor 
policy preferences without at the same time embracing economic orthodoxy about balancing the 
budget each year. 
 The CED trustees believed that the ultraconservatives’ economic plans would slow the 
economy, and thereby risk falling profits, depression, and renewed social disruption. However, 
they did not adopt the liberals’ approach because of its emphasis on manipulating the tax rate and 
using increases and decreases in government spending to heat up or cool down the economy. 
They feared that repeated economic forecasts of inadequate demand by liberal experts might lead 
to policies that would increase government expenditures year after year.  In the interest of 
limiting such expenditures as much as possible, the CED suggested its own formula for a 
“stabilizing budget policy,” which called for setting tax rates at a level that would balance the 
budget over a period of several years while providing for a high level of employment. This new 
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method of balancing the budget over time supposedly would be accomplished by allowing tax 
receipts to be lower in times of economic recession, thereby leading to automatic deficit 
spending by the federal government. This is often the form of deficit spending that the fractured-
elite account is in effect alluding to when it discusses support for social spending by corporate 
moderates. Such temporary deficit spending, including higher outlays for unemployment 
benefits, would then presumably lead to higher tax collections once the economy recovered, 
thereby making it possible to decrease government debt and to eliminate excess purchasing 
power.  
A year later CED provided a 75-page synthesis of its full program in Monetary and 
Fiscal Policy For Greater Economic Stability (1948). The report rejected the need for annual 
balanced budgets while at the time criticizing the efforts at demand management by the liberal 
and left Keynesians. It instead placed strong emphasis on the use of monetary policy to stimulate 
the economy when necessary, or to reduce demand if inflation increased. The CED policy 
statement claimed that the Federal Reserve Board and its Open Market Committee could move 
more quickly than Congress, and that monetary policy has a more immediate impact. Historical 
studies show that this rationale was adopted by every administration from Eisenhower through 
Carter, and that the post-1948 Truman Administration was influenced by it as well, perhaps in 
part because several CED trustees served as directors of regional Fed banks and a CED trustee 
was appointed to chair the Fed in early 1948 (Biven, 2002, p. 34; Domhoff, 2013, pp. 73, 85-86, 
160-162, 217; Matusow, 1998. p. 169 ; Stein, 1969). 
In principle, the mix of fiscal and monetary policies advocated by the CED did not 
necessitate any expansion of the traditional functions of government, as CED trustees clearly 
understood at the time (Domhoff, 2013, p. 73; Fuccillo, 1969, p. 318; Thomson, 1954). 
Moreover, the emphasis on monetary policy meant that the Fed could induce recessions by 
raising interest rates, which in effect made unemployment for workers, not higher taxes for the 
corporate owners and executives, the accepted way in which inflation would be controlled. Put 
another way, even though the corporate moderates were willing to resort to their version of fiscal 
policy in some circumstances, there was a general corporate preference for monetary policy over 
fiscal policy 20-25 years before the crisis of the late 1960s and early 1970s unfolded. 
 
Why did Corporate Moderates Abandon Commercial Keynesianism? 
 
According to the fractured-elite perspective, Keynesianism continued to be favored by 
corporate moderates until at least 1971, but around that time it supposedly began to fail as theory 
and practice (Mizruchi, 2013, pp. 140-141, 165-168). Corporate-dominance theory argues that 
both of these assertions are false. The most powerful corporate moderates, the chief executives of 
large industrial corporations, rapidly abandoned Keynesianism for an emphasis on high interest 
rates and balanced budgets in the late 1960s and early 1970s, but Keynesian economists, 
including a prominent CED advisor, had a solid analysis of what happened to the economy in the 
1970s. The fractured-elite version begins with the key issue, the demand-pull inflation that began 
in 1966 due to increased spending for the Vietnam War (but not the War on Poverty, as the 
fractured-elite analysis claims) and the tightening of labor markets. But it does not mention that 
President Johnson was hesitant to call for the wage-price controls that were used to control 
inflation in World War II and the Korean War, and that the conservative coalition stalled on the 
tax hikes finally called for by President Johnson and many corporate moderates in 1967 in order 
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to cool off demand-pull inflation in commercial-Keynesian fashion (Domhoff, 2013, pp. 139-
141).  
The inevitable increase in inflation (from 1.0 percent in January 1965, to 4.7 percent in 
December 1968) had worldwide consequences because it also caused inflation for the country’s 
trading partners. At the same time, the federal government was demanding that they hold on to 
the dollars they were earning through exports to the United States, which were increasing as a 
result of the continuing lowering of tariffs negotiated by corporate moderates in the aftermath of 
their all-out efforts to pass the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (Domhoff, 2013, pp. 105-106). The 
flood of  “Eurodollars” fed into the Eurodollar market that the London financial district and the 
Bank of England had slowly constructed in the late 1950s and early 1960s to boost the profits of 
British banks by circumventing the Bretton Woods agreements and any attempts at controlling 
American banks by the American government (Burn, 2006, pp. 9, 72, 129-130, and Chapter 6; 
Fourcade-Gourinchas & Babb, 2002, pp. 549-556; Mann, 2013, pp. 141-142). Ironically, the 
British banks made a considerable portion of their rising profits after 1968 by lending 
Eurodollars to American banks, which dampened the intended effects of high interest rates on 
inflation in the United States. In June 1969, six months after Nixon took office, the bankers in 
charge of his Treasury Department concluded that the administration should deal with a 
burgeoning balance-of-payments problem by honoring the government’s agreement to exchange 
dollars for gold as long as it could for geopolitical reasons, but should close the gold window 
immediately and without negotiations when it became necessary to do so for domestic economic 
reasons (Matusow, 1998, p. 128).  
The Nixon Administration first tacked inflation with an approach long recommend by 
advocates of commercial Keynesianism, higher interest rates and budget balancing, but inflation 
rose from 4.4 percent in January 1969, to 6.2 percent one year later, and was only back to 4.4 
percent in July 1971. During the same 31-month period, unemployment grew from 3.4 percent to 
6.0 percent. To deal with these problems, and help ensure his reelection, Nixon instituted a 
temporary wage-price freeze and called for a tax cut in August 1971. He also announced that the 
United States would no longer exchange American gold for American dollars held by other 
nations, which left the country’s shocked allies with no positive alternatives to capitulating to 
this exercise of American power by putting the value of their currencies at the mercy of market 
forces. Together, these new policies were meant to give corporations and the Nixon 
Administration more flexibility in dealing with inflation and unions at home while improving the 
competitiveness of American corporations abroad, and they succeeded (Domhoff, 2013, pp. 170-
172; Matusow, 1998, Chapter 5). Inflation dipped as low as 2.7 percent 11 months after Nixon 
announced the new policies and stood at a tolerable 3.4 percent when he was reelected. The 
sequence of events outlined in this and the previous paragraph, which was triggered by 
attempting to fight an imperial war without inflation controls, deserves more far more weight 
than the fractured-elite account gives it in evaluating the viability of Keynesian-based policies. 
Nor does fractured-elite theory emphasize the distinctiveness of the powerful external 
economic shocks that led to a new round of inflation in early 1973, which exploded to 8.7 
percent by the end of the year and to 12.3 percent by the end of 1974. The fractured-elite account 
acknowledges that this new inflation was due in good part to the oil shock caused by the Arab oil 
embargo in October 1973, which is recast as “the culmination of what can now be seen as the 
excessive consumption of a critical natural resource without regard for the consequences” 
(Mizruchi, 2013, p. 139). Despite the external source of the problem, the fractured-elite analysis 
nonetheless argues that Keynesianism had “stopped working” and “began to fail” because at the 
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same time unemployment rose from 4.9 percent in January 1973, to as high as 9.0 percent in 
May 1975 (Mizruchi, 2013, pp. 166-167).  Contrary to this claim, a moderate Keynesian 
economist, Charles Schultze, who was based at The Brookings Institution, provided the 
corporate moderates serving as CED trustees with an astute analysis of the economy’s problems 
from 1973 to early 1975 at a special CED conference in May 1975 (CED, 1975). In addition to 
his position at Brookings, Schultze also had been an advisor to several CED study groups 
beginning in 1968 and later served on its Research Advisory Board.   
According to Schultze, the sudden downturn in the economy was due to a sharp decline 
in consumer demand and had little or nothing to do with the earlier demand-pull inflation or 
Nixon’s earlier economic policies. Instead, he claimed, the economy suffered three post-1972 
inflationary shocks that acted like new taxes on consumers, and thereby decreased consumer 
purchasing power.  To begin with, farm prices rose sharply due to bad harvests around the world; 
this problem was exacerbated in the United States by the sale of grain and soybean reserves to 
the Soviet Union in 1972 and 1973 for strategic reasons, which strained American reserves in the 
process. The increases in farm prices took $6.5 billion (in 2012 dollars) out of consumers’ 
pockets. Then the costs of non-petroleum raw materials went up as well, which cost consumers 
another several billion dollars (CED, 1975).  
The third and biggest shock came from the six-month Arab oil embargo, which is 
emphasized in the fractured-elite analysis to the exclusion of the two earlier shocks. It 
quadrupled the price of oil and sent $36 billion of consumer purchasing power to oil-producing 
countries, only $5 billion of which came back to commercial and investment banks in the United 
States for loans and investments. In addition, the resulting inflationary spiral pushed individuals 
and corporations into higher tax brackets, removing another $55-60 billion from consumption 
and investment, which is another important issue that is not discussed in the fractured-elite 
account.  Due to the major decline in demand, employers began to lay off workers, which of 
course increased the unemployment rate (CED, 1975).  This analysis is supported by later studies 
of this time period, although the effect of lifting the temporary Nixon price controls, which lasted 
in a gradually weakened form from late 1971 into 1973, has to be factored into the equation 
(Blinder, 1979; Blinder & Rudd, 2008, pp. 6-7, 15-16). It is noteworthy, but not an issue that can 
be pursued in this article, that the three external shock waves, when combined with the effects of 
Nixon’s decision to close the gold window, generated volatility in currency values and new 
political regimes in many countries as well as the aforementioned inflation (e.g., Fourcade-
Gourinchas & Babb, 2002; Krippner, 2011; Mann, 2013, Chapter 6). 
Once again contrary to fractured-elite theory, it seems unlikely that the problems facing 
the economy were a mystery to Schultze and the other Keynesian economists at The Brookings 
Institution, who were highly visible and vocal at the time. Put simply, the economy was suffering 
from cost-push inflation, which requires different policy responses than does demand-pull 
inflation because of the reduction in consumer demand it creates. Keynesian advisors therefore 
thought it was a bad idea for the Federal Reserve Board to fight inflation by raising interest rates 
under these circumstances, but the corporate community and the Nixon and Ford administrations 
decided otherwise.  
Still, several mainstream Keynesian economists, including Schultze, even after he was 
appointed as the chair of the Council of Economic Advisors by President Jimmy Carter in 1977, 
continued to advocate tax reductions for low-income workers (perhaps through lower payroll 
taxes) and increased government spending (Domhoff, 2013, Chapter 11). They thought such 
remedies were possible because there was no general underlying dynamic within the economy 
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itself that was driving inflation at that point.3 By 1975, however, most corporate moderates had 
joined with the ultraconservatives in rejecting fiscal policy options because issues having to do 
with defending and increasing their power in the face of union demands were more salient to 
them (Domhoff, 2013, pp. 208-210). Nevertheless, the corporate leaders’ emphasis on high 
interest rates and cuts in social spending did not keep them from successfully lobbying for large 
permanent tax cuts for higher-income individuals and corporations during the Carter years, 
which marked a complete triumph for the corporate community (Domhoff, 2013, Chapter 11; 
Hacker & Pierson, 2010, pp. 98-100; Mizruchi, 2013, Chapter 7). 
Contrary to fractured-elite theory, hardliners among the corporate moderates were 
gradually abandoning their version of Keynesianism between 1969 and 1972 for three 
intertwined reasons. First, as already noted, the hardliners were determined to defeat unions 
because they perceived their wage demands as the reason for the inflation that developed in the 
late 1960s. In effect, they were arguing that unions, especially in construction, were taking 
advantage of tight labor markets to win exorbitant wage hikes that exceeded the growth in 
productivity, and thereby causing cost-push inflation. At that point the cost-of-living adjustments 
built into many union contracts also became completely unacceptable to them. In making their 
analysis, they were playing down the demand-pull inflation of the late 1960s and denying that 
unionized workers were for the most part playing catch-up.  They therefore increasingly turned 
to their version of monetary theory as the main rationale for the policies they preferred, which in 
effect advocated high interest rates and rising unemployment in order to defeat unions (Domhoff, 
2013, pp. 193-195 209-211, 229-230)  
The hardliners’ concern about the increasing costs of their new factories led them to form 
the Construction Users Anti-Inflation Roundtable in 1969 in order to hold down wage increases 
in the construction industry; the new group’s efforts played a role in shaping the Nixon 
Administration’s labor and inflation policies in relation to the construction industry (Domhoff, 
2013, pp. 163-166, 169; Linder, 1999, Chapters 8-9). This organization, in turn, was the nucleus 
of the Business Roundtable, which was established in 1972 and became operative over the 
course of the next two years. It had a primary focus on labor issues, a fact that is obscured in the 
fractured-elite analysis because of its incorrect emphasis on the corporate moderates’ concern 
with regulation by the EPA and OSHA, which did not develop until three or four years later and 
was greatly overblown (Domhoff, 2013, Chapter 10; Gross, 1995, pp. 234-239; Mizruchi, 2013, 
pp. 140, 143, 160-163). This new policy-discussion organization was created through a merger 
of the Construction Users Anti-Inflation Roundtable and the Labor Law Reform Group, both of 
which were expressly concerned with weakening unions (Gross, 1995, pp. 202-205, 234-235; 
Linder, 1999, pp. 207, 209). 
The Business Roundtable’s founding statement presented an analysis of the situation it 
thought corporations faced. More exactly, it laid out “two narratives,” one focused on the 
supposed negative effects of inflation on everyone, the other on the “labor gains at the expense 
of capital” throughout the entire postwar era (Reuss, 2013, p. 444). Since construction costs were 
rising in the late 1960s, in a context in which prices presumably could not be easily increased 
due to increasing international competition, the Business Roundtable claimed there was a profit 
squeeze for those large industrial corporations that were rapidly building new factories to 
maintain market share and enhance profits in a booming economy (Reuss, 2013, pp. 102-103).  
Right or wrong, the two narratives added up to a rationale for undercutting labor unions.  
                                                 
3
 The idea of “core inflation,” which excludes sudden changes in agricultural and energy prices from the inflation 
equation, was introduced in 1975 in a paper published by The Brookings Institution (Gordon, 1975). 
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Detailed analyses of national income data for the postwar era as a whole reveal only a 
slight upward trend in labor’s share, and as so often, different assumptions lead to different 
results (Heintz, 2013; Reuss, 2013, Chapter 5, for new findings and detailed discussions). For 
example, if executive salaries are included in the same category with profits, the size of the labor 
share is reduced. This is due to the fact that executive compensation increased at a faster rate 
than average wages from the early 1950s to the early 1960s, flattened for a few years, and then 
rose even more rapidly after 1968, which is also when corporate moderates began to complain 
very loudly about undeserved gains by blue-collar workers (Reuss, 2013, pp. 144-145, 444).  
Rising executive compensation to one side, the definition of the labor share that best 
encompasses non-executive workers for large companies actually showed a decline in the first 
half of the 1960s, which was overlooked by the corporate moderates as they wrote about a 
golden age for record-setting profits. But the labor share rose rapidly in the second half of the 
decade, which was all that mattered as far as the Business Roundtable’s grievances concerning 
their need for continuing increases in profits. The fact that profits had started to recover in 1971 
(later stalled by the mid-1970s recession) was not considered good news because as of 1972 they 
were still below the unusually high level of 1965-1966 (Reuss, 2013, p. 102).  
Aside from the corporate leaders’ concern over the share of national income going to 
their profits, an increasing number of them were also motivated by a desire to put an end to any 
government inclination to develop permanent wage-price controls, which had been tried during 
the Kennedy and Johnson administrations despite corporate (and union) resistance (Barber, 1975; 
Cochrane, 1975; Domhoff, 2013, pp. 110-112, 138-140, 166-168). Wage-price controls 
administered by government boards were an ongoing concern for the new hardliners because in 
1970 the most centrist of the corporate moderates had advocated a temporary version of such 
boards in a CED report (1970, pp. 17-18) on controlling inflation. (This concern on the part of 
the hardliners was then heightened by the temporary wage-price controls the Nixon 
Administration created in the summer of 1971, with the strong urging of many corporate 
moderates.) This issue receives no consideration in the fractured-elite analysis. The CED report 
making this surprising recommendation also said that lower interest rates, higher taxes, and 
higher federal expenditures were needed to deal with “the urgent problems of our cities, 
education, poverty and welfare, health care, and the environment.” In other words, at least for a 
brief time, the more centrist trustees were arguing for a very different direction than the one 
advocated by more conservative CED trustees; this difference was reflected in the large number 
of disagreements that were added to the report, as well as six dissenting votes by hardliners who 
opposed its publication altogether (Domhoff, 2013, pp. 167-168). 
Finally, there was a third anti-union prong to the approach taken by the members of the 
Business Roundtable, on which the fractured-elite analysis is once again wanting. They were 
determined to make sure that inflation was controlled only by higher interest rates set by the 
Federal Reserve Board, not by raising taxes on the well-to-do while at the same time reducing 
government subsidies and tax breaks that benefited corporations, as liberal Keynesians 
advocated. Furthermore, by 1971-1972 the centrists within the corporate community were losing 
whatever interest they once had in spending more money on social problems, except through the 
methods they had come to champion, food stamps and the Earned Income Tax Credit, which do 
not interfere with low-wage labor markets and in effect subsidize agricultural interests and 
companies that pay low wages (Domhoff, 2013, p. 177; Quadagno, 1994, p. 122). According to a 
corporate-dominance perspective, the shift in policy preferences by corporate moderates was 
made possible by the decline in turmoil in inner cities and the society at large beginning in 1971 
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(Domhoff, 2013, pp. 211-213, for a discussion of the varying reasons for the decline in social 
disruption between 1971 and 1975).  The only policy option left to control inflation was the one 
virtually all corporate moderates now favored—higher interest rates imposed by the Fed. 
Ultraconservatives in the corporate community and members of the conservative voting coalition 
in Congress eagerly embraced this option because they had preferred it all along. 
The fractured-elite account misses these crucial changes because of its emphasis on the 
results of a self-administered questionnaire filled out in 1971. It showed that 57 percent of the 
120 chief executives and owners that returned the questionnaire could be classified as liberal or 
moderate Keynesians based on their answers to questions about the need for balanced budgets, 
the value of a guaranteed annual income, and moderately redistributive reforms such as closing 
tax loopholes and raising the inheritance tax (Barton, 1985, p. 63; Mizruchi, 2013, pp. 7, 77, 
140). The fractured-elite analysis therefore concludes that the “postwar moderate consensus 
remained solid” in the early 1970s (Mizruchi, 2013, p. 141). But responses to hypothetical 
questions on a self-administered questionnaire by a sample of chief executive in the industrial 
sector (“only slightly more than 50%” responded), the nonindustrial sector (79 percent of whom 
responded), and owners worth over $100 million (31 percent of whom responded) do not reveal 
what the main power wielders in the corporate community were actually doing at the time 
(Barton, 1985, p. 55). As a result of these mistaken emphases, and in spite of its earlier focus on 
the Construction Users Anti-Inflation Roundtable and the Business Roundtable, the fractured-
elite analysis ends up claiming that the accelerating rightward slant during the 1970s was due to 
a  “counteroffensive” by the ultraconservatives. It therefore discusses the rise of the Heritage 
Foundation, the American Enterprise Institute, and the foundations that supported them, which 
are minor and beside the point from a corporate-dominance perspective. The fractured-elite 
account then goes completely wrong when it concludes that “As traditional conservatives 
mobilized, especially those associated with the Far Right, large corporations began to slowly 
follow in their path”(Mizruchi, 2013, p. 178). It thereby loses sight of the fact that the hardliners 
among the corporate moderates were adopting new policy stances several years before right-
wing think tanks and foundations were having any policy impact (Peschek, 1987).  
Nor did events of the early to mid-1970s make the conservative coalition any more 
ultraconservative than it already was; a further move to the right came later with the arrival of 
southern Republicans into Congress in the late 1970s and 1980s. Not only was the conservative 
coalition as ultraconservative from 1972 through 1976 as it had been in the past, but it also came 
together for more votes and was highly successful (Domhoff, 2013, pp. 183, 238-239, 261-262; 
Shelley, 1983, pp. 34, 39). On some issues the corporate community and the conservatives in 
Congress simply relied on vetoes by President Gerald Ford to block liberal-labor proposals 
(Domhoff, 2013, pp. 203-206). 
 
The Corporate Moderates and Unions 
 
The fractured-elite account claims that a second reason for corporate moderation in the 
postwar era was provided by a tacit capital-labor accord that the corporate elite reluctantly had to 
accept because of the power of unions (Mizruchi, 2013, pp. 4, 9, 93, 109). It repeatedly stresses 
that the corporate elite disliked unions and collective bargaining, but was pragmatic enough to 
“make peace with the labor movement” and even to concede that “unions could have positive 
aspects as well” (Mizruchi, 2013, pp. 81, 89). This conclusion is in part based on surveys of 
corporate executives, starting with the 1939 Fortune survey in which a large plurality appeared 
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to accept the NLRA; furthermore, a large majority replied that in general it “agreed with the idea 
of labor unions” (Mizruchi, 2013, p. 82). The fractured-elite argument also focuses at length on a 
five-year contract negotiated between General Motors and the United Automobile Workers in 
1950, which is seen as emblematic because it “set the United States down the path of a private 
welfare state” (Mizruchi, 2013, p. 97). General Motors offered this five-year contract in the 
context of record growth and profits, but the health and pension benefits included in the 
settlement were the result of strong union pressure. 
However, as the fractured-elite analysis notes, in recent decades several scholars have 
questioned the idea of a capital-labor accord based on a variety of archival records (Mizruchi, 
2013, p. 98). In the face of this disagreement, the fractured-elite perspective concludes that the 
skeptics have “read history backwards;” that is, they allegedly assume that what the corporate 
moderates did in the 1970s was want they wanted to do earlier, which is very severe criticism 
(Mizruchi, 2013, p. 109). From a corporate-dominance perspective, however, the fractured-elite 
account is refuted by the meticulous work of one of those skeptics, James A. Gross (1981, 1995), 
a labor-relations scholar who has carefully studied the legislative changes in the NLRA down 
through the decades, along with decisions handed down by the NLRB and the courts.   
The fractured-elite account of the origins and aftermath of the Taft-Hartley Act 
recognizes that many of its provisions were harsh (Mizruchi, 2013, pp. 90-92), and states that 
organized labor “bitterly opposed” the bill, but it nonetheless concludes that the general outcome 
of this legislative conflict implied “a broad acceptance by large corporations of the legitimacy of 
independent, organized labor unions as a central institution in American life” (Mizruchi, 2013, p. 
93). However, Gross’s (1981, Chapter 1; 1995, Chapter 1) analysis of the Taft-Hartley 
amendments to the NLRA reveals that they were a much more serious setback for the union 
movement than the fractured-elite account realizes. For example, the act included fundamental 
changes in labor policy that gave corporate executives more leeway to hamper organizing and to 
appeal to the courts. One seemingly minor addition to the “Findings and Policy” section asserted 
that “some practices engaged in by unions were obstructing commerce;” another addition 
asserted the employers’ right of “free speech” (Gross, 1995, p. 2). Other amendments banned 
mass picketing and secondary boycotts. The usefulness of picketing in the actual disruption of 
work was further limited by a Supreme Court ruling in 1951 stating that it was illegal for a union 
to shut down an entire construction project based on a dispute with only one contractor or 
subcontractor. (Sit-down strikes, perhaps the most powerful of organizing strategies, already had 
been lost to a Supreme Court ruling in 1939).  
Thanks in good part to government support for already existing unions during World War 
II, union membership had grown from 8.7 million in 1940 to 14.3 million in 1945, but that year 
also turned out to be the high point for union density, 35.4 percent. The figure declined to 30.4 
percent by 1950, which does not fit with the idea that unions had forced a standoff with 
corporations (Mayer, 2004, p. 23, Table A1). As for the 1950s, Gross (1995, Chapters 7-8) 
shows that the corporate lawyers appointed to the NLRB by President Dwight D. Eisenhower did 
everything they could to undermine unions, and that the Landrum-Griffin Labor-Management 
Act of 1959 further limited the ability of unions to picket (Gross, 1995, pp. 142-143).  Union 
density, which had returned to a near-high point of 34.8 percent in 1954 due to the low 
employment rates during the Korean War, fell back to 30.9 percent in 1960 and 28.2 percent in 
1965 (Mayer, 2004, pp. 22-23, Table 1A). At the same time, there was stagnation in actual union 
membership at a little over 17 million from 1956 to 1965, when the growth in public-employee 
unions during the late 1960s began to mask the continuing decline in private-sector unions 
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(Goldfield, 1987, p. 15; Miller & Canak, 1995, p. 19, Table 1). In spite of the power elite’s 
successful efforts to undercut unions during the postwar era, the fractured-elite perspective 
nonetheless claims that “most of the large corporations in the industrial Northeast and Midwest 
had by 1950 accepted the existence of unions and the necessity of collective bargaining” 
(Mizruchi, 2013, p. 98). 
In addition to the evidence provided by Gross (1981, 1995) for anti-union efforts by 
corporate moderates and their small army of lawyers, CED policy statements and organizational 
efforts by some of its trustees provide an ideal vantage point for viewing the ongoing conflict 
between all members of the corporate community and organized labor in the postwar era. In what 
the fractured-elite analysis merely calls “surprisingly conservative views on labor issues,” the 
CED trustees were supportive of the key provisions in the Taft-Hartley Act (CED, 1947b; 
Mizruchi, 2013, p. 90). Moreover, a CED (1958) policy statement on inflation in the late 1950s 
recommended still more restrictions on unions; it further claimed that labor’s contractual 
demands were causing cost-push inflation, so the similar assertions by corporate moderates in the 
late 1960s were nothing new (Domhoff 2013, pp. 91-94). The fractured-elite analysis deals with 
this CED conclusion by citing a newspaper account, which reported that the CED left the cost-
push claim as “still open” for future analysis; furthermore, the policy statement allowed that 
business might “play a role in inflation” (Mizruchi, 2013, p. 99).  
Once again relying on a newspaper article, the fractured-elite theory claims that a CED 
report published in 1961 included “a series of labor-friendly proposals,” albeit in an independent 
report commissioned by the CED from a group of economists and labor-relations advisors 
(Mizruchi, 2013, p. 99). The report did say unions were on the whole useful and were not the 
only cause of inflation, and suggested that right-to-work laws should not be allowed in individual 
states. But it also concluded that the rulings issued by the NLRB were too intrusive and that there 
should be less government involvement in the regulation of collective bargaining (CED, 1961). 
In response, the staff of the NLRB claimed that less regulation would make collective bargaining 
a rarity because “We witness daily, in the cases we process, the efforts of respondents to avoid 
and evade their duty to bargain by a variety of devices and stratagems” (Gross, 1995, p. 174). 
The fractured-elite account of this commission report also ignores the angry responses to 
it from many members of the corporate community, including some trustees of the CED. The 
critics seemed especially upset by the idea that the section of the Taft-Hartley Act allowing states 
to pass right-to-work laws should be repealed (Schriftgiesser, 1967, pp. 166-167). (By 1965, 19 
states, all in the South, Great Plains, and Rocky Mountains, had right-to-work laws.) The result 
of this negative publicity was a new CED subcommittee, made up primarily of leading 
industrialists, which issued a policy statement that took positions similar to those of the NAM 
(CED, 1964). It asserted that unions are a primary cause of inflation and that right-to-work laws 
are essential to protect individual freedom. The salaried president of the CED at the time, a 
former economist and vice president at the Federal Reserve Bank in Boston, later said that the 
commissioned report was a “terrible mistake” (Domhoff, 2013, pp. 149-150; Hurwitz, 1989, p. 
20; 1990). 
Over and beyond their anti-union policy statements, CED trustees were among the 
leaders of an all-out effort launched in 1965 to change labor legislation in the face of a 
controversial decision by the pro-union NLRB of the 1960s, which prohibited the “outsourcing” 
of work from unionized to non-unionized companies without reopening collective bargaining 
agreements (Gross, 1995, pp. 172-174). This and other decisions by the Kennedy labor board 
were very alarming to corporate leaders in general, but the fractured-elite view wrongly 
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characterizes this new corporate initiative (coordinated by the Labor Law Reform Group) as 
primarily an attempt to preserve right-to-work laws in the face of the overwhelmingly 
Democratic Congress elected in 1964 (Mizruchi, 2013, p. 155). Most of all, though, the corporate 
moderates wanted to eliminate the explicit statement of purpose in the NLRA that it was the 
policy of the United States to encourage the practice of collective bargaining (Gross, 1995, pp. 
204-206). As for the liberal-labor attempt to eliminate the right-to-work clause, it was defeated 
by filibusters in the Senate in 1965 and then again in 1966 while the Labor Law Reform Group 
was working on its long-range project (Bernstein, 1996, pp. 307-312). 
Finally, it is noteworthy that CED trustees were prominent among the corporate leaders 
who founded the Construction Users Anti-Inflation Roundtable at a 1969 meeting of the 
Business Council (the name adopted by the Business Advisory Council in the early 1960s) 
(Domhoff, 2013, p. 163-164; Linder, 1999, p. 190). The fractured-elite analysis notes the 
formation of this new action group and recognizes its concern with rising construction wages, 
but it does not mention the considerable role of CED trustees in forming it (Mizruchi, 2013, p. 
107). Nor does it appreciate that the anti-union efforts of the 1960s had little or no impact until 
Republicans took control of the Department of Labor and the National Labor Relations Board 
after the 1968 presidential election. 
The general strategies of the corporate community to weaken unions aside, it is also the 
case that the fractured-elite account does not provide the full context for why General Motors 
had to accede to the union’s demands for health-care and retirement benefits in the 1950 
contract.  Building on precedent-setting government rulings during World War II, one by the IRS 
stating that corporations can deduct health and pension benefits as a business expense, the other 
by the temporary National War Labor Board stating that wage controls did not apply to fringe 
benefits, the NLRB reaffirmed in 1948 that collective bargaining over health and other fringe 
benefits was permissible. This decision then received support from the Supreme Court in 1949 
(Mizruchi, 2013, p. 97). Also in 1949, a presidentially appointed strike settlement board, charged 
with bringing an end to a prolonged strike in the steel industry, ruled that the steel companies had 
to accept the United Steelworkers’ demand for pensions and social insurance “in the absence of 
adequate government programs” (Brown, 1999, pp. 154, 159). These decisions were deeply 
disturbing to steel executives and other industrialists because they did not want to go any further 
into the benefits realm.   
From a corporate-dominance perspective, this series of governmental decisions 
concerning bargaining on fringe benefits, along with the inability of the labor movement to 
unionize the South, led to a private welfare state in some industrial sectors, not the contract 
settlement between General Motors and the United Automobile Workers in 1950 (Mizruchi, 
2013, p. 97). Moreover, these rulings may have saved the union movement from an early demise, 
a possibility that goes unexplored in the fractured-elite analysis. They provided “an escape hatch 
from the threat to union security posed by Taft-Hartley” because “fringe benefits obtained on 
union terms provided the ‘virtual equivalent’ of a closed shop” (Brown, 1999, pp. 154, 159). 
Viewed from this angle, General Motors was negotiating in a context in which the White House 
and the courts would not back any refusal to bargain over benefits, and in which the United 
Automobile Workers knew it had to win on social benefits if it was to survive and prosper. 
Moreover, General Motors and its corporate allies could not contemplate going to Congress for 
legislative redress as long as the Democrats held the White House and there were enough non-
Southern Democrats in Congress to uphold a presidential veto, as there were after the 1948 
elections.  
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However, federal government backing for the status quo vis-à-vis unions during the 
Truman Administration did not stop the automobile companies from moving their factories to the 
Detroit suburbs, as they began to do in the late 1940s and early 1950s, at least in part to weaken 
unions (Boyle, 1995, p. 74). More generally, a wide range of industrial corporations gradually 
shifted as many manufacturing facilities as possible to the South, which became the low-wage 
“offshore” manufacturing platform of that era. One research team described this plant movement 
as a “minor industrial revolution” as far as the South was concerned (Browne, Skees, Swanson, 
Thompson, & Unnevehr, 1992, p. 24). 
As a result of its numerous misunderstandings and oversights, fractured-elite theory 
presents a more positive picture of the corporate moderates’ general strategy towards unions and 
labor-management relations in the postwar era than was the case, even though it bends over 
backwards to point out that the corporate moderates’ acceptance of the truce was begrudging and 
a “necessary evil” (Mizruchi, 2013, pp. 86). But there never was a moment when the corporate 
leaders were not in attack mode in one venue or another, and their success is indicated by a stark 
fact that was mentioned earlier: they never lost on a piece of legislation related to unions after 
the passage of the NLRA in 1935. With the exception of their setbacks in the late 1940s on the 
issue of bargaining over social benefits, and several decisions by the Kennedy NLRB between 
1962 and 1965 that they vigorously opposed, the corporate moderates also won most of the 
administrative and legal battles as well. Their administrative, legislative, and legal containment 
of unions was all but complete by 1971 due to several key rulings by a Republican majority on 
the NLRB, although many of the large established unions continued to win contract battles for 
several more years (Domhoff, 2013, p. 158). 
 
Why Did The Decline of Unions Accelerate? 
 
The fractured-elite perspective alludes to general societal “frustrations with continuing 
racial conflict” and concludes that “the civil rights and anti-war movements set in motion a series 
of forces that required a response” (Mizruchi, 2013, pp. 109, 139). However, it makes little or no 
mention of racial tensions within the union movement. The one exception is the comment that 
during World War II “minorities often faced substantial resistance not from employers or union 
leaders but from other workers” (Mizruchi, 2013, p. 88).  Nowhere does it state that African 
Americans, women, and other previously excluded groups had to organize and disrupt in order to 
bring about changes in the racial and gender hierarchies that might be of benefit to them.  
Nor is any agency attributed to the unionized white workers who resisted the integration 
of workplaces and unions, or to the increasing number of white Democratic voters who turned to 
the Republicans for their own reasons starting in 1966, primarily due to their resistance to the 
demands by African Americans for the integration of neighborhoods, schools, and work (Boyle, 
1998; Frymer, 2008; Quadagno, 1994; Sugrue, 2001, 2008).  By the 1970s white grievances and 
resentments began to include religious and social issues as well (Crespino, 2008; Quadagno & 
Rohlinger, 2009; Rohlinger, 2002). 
From a corporate-dominance perspective, as the previous paragraph suggests, the 
fractured-elite account does not give enough weight to what was happening within the liberal-
labor alliance. The civil rights movement was supported only with hesitation and trepidation by 
most white liberals because they feared a white backlash if change came too fast (Brinkley, 
1995). Further, the civil rights movement was not supported at all by most craft union leaders or 
the white rank-and-file in any type of union, which includes the rank-and-file of the most liberal 
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of the large industrial unions, the United Automobile Workers (Boyle, 1995, 1998; Frymer, 
2008; Quadagno, 1994; Sugrue, 2001, 2008). The result was increased African American 
militancy at work sites in major urban areas in the North in the early 1960s and a major backlash 
by white voters that fragmented the Democratic voting coalition. This job-related backlash was 
exacerbated by the attempts at school and neighborhood integration, which for the most part 
were defeated by aroused white neighborhoods. This backlash was underestimated at the time by 
most analysts inside and outside the academy, who thought that white workers would gradually 
accept their black co-workers due to the main tenets of liberal individualism, or at the least 
would continue to vote Democratic out of a concern with bread-and-butter issues and the 
preservation of their unions. But race trumped class; the white South gradually switched to the 
Republican Party and the liberal-labor electoral alliance was severely weakened in large 
industrialized states outside the South (e.g, Boyle, 1995, 1998; Carmines & Stimson, 1989; 
Frymer, 2008). In addition, the conservative coalition in Congress regained much of its strength 
after the 1966 Congressional elections (Manley, 1973; Shelley, 1983). 
At the same time as the liberal-labor alliance was fragmenting, the corporate community, 
including the NAM, was generally supportive of civil rights legislation after making sure that 
Title IV, which concerned hiring, was crafted to their satisfaction (Delton, 2009, pp. 35-36; 
Domhoff, 2013, pp. 123-125; Golland, 2011, Chapter 2). The ultraconservative leaders of some 
corporations, such as DuPont, saw the integration of their workforces as consistent with their 
anti-union goals: “Adopting affirmative action in no way impeded its longstanding anti-
unionism; indeed, in some ways the new affirmative action programs complemented DuPont’s 
fight against unions” (Delton, 2009, p. 279). As the fractured-elite analysis notes, the response to 
the civil rights movement by the corporate elite “was often one of accommodation rather than 
direct confrontation” (Mizruchi, 2013, p. 109). 
Unions fought two more battles over labor legislation in the 1970s, but lost (Domhoff, 
2013, pp. 205-206, 221, 223-226; Gross, 1995, pp. 236-239; Mizruchi, 2013, pp. 158-160), and 
then came the rout during the Reagan years (Domhoff, 2013, pp. 243-244; Gross, 1995, pp. 246-
265; Mizruchi, 2013, pp. 187-191). As the fractured-elite account concludes, the union 
movement “experienced a long-term decline of membership from more than one-third of the 
workforce in the mid-1950s to fewer than one-quarter by the mid-1970s” (Mizruchi, 2013, pp. 
158). But it never says that white racism within most unions and the movement of more and 
more white voters in both the North and the South to the Republican Party in 1966 and thereafter 
created the opening for the corporate community to redouble its efforts to finish off unions in the 
private sector. 
 
Corporate Networks and Bank Centrality 
 
As briefly noted in the Introduction, the fractured-elite account claims that the members 
of boards of directors of large commercial banks were a third source of moderation in the 
postwar era because they were sources of information and normative consensus, and had “the 
ability to see issues from multiple perspectives” (Mizruchi, 2013, p. 125). Crucially, they were 
able to disseminate their information, normative consensus, and multiple perspectives because of 
“their centrality in the social networks created by ties among the leaders of the largest American 
corporations” (Mizruchi, 2013, p. 111). However, due to the decline in commercial banking 
caused by the rise of insurance and finance companies as direct lenders, along with a steep rise in 
lending by shadow banks (non-regulated banks), the commercial banks lost their central position 
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in the network. They also suffered failures and mergers. The replacement of banks at the center 
of the corporate network mattered because “No group of firms replaced the banks as the glue that 
held the system together” (Mizruchi, 2013, p. 196). Making matters worse, the merger movement 
of the mid-1980s led to increased CEO turnover and less continuity at the top of large 
corporations (Mizruchi, 2013, pp. 8, 214-221). 
The literature on the impact of corporate networks on various outcome variables suggests 
that director interlocks between two corporations can facilitate the flow of information from 
corporation to corporation and thereby aid in, or make possible, the adoption of new corporate 
practices, such as lucrative retirement packages for top executives, by-laws to ward off takeover 
bids, and a multi-division form of organization, and one study found a positive correlation 
between bank representation on a corporation’s board and the amount of external financing the 
corporation used (Mizruchi, 1996, pp. 286- 289, for a summary). The literature also shows that 
interlocked corporations are more likely to have members on government trade advisory 
committees (Dreiling & Darves, 2011). Along the same lines, corporations that have similar 
numbers and types of interlocks, although not necessarily with each other, have similar patterns 
of political campaign contributions or give common testimony to Congress (Burris, 1987; 
Mizruchi, 1992). There is evidence that corporate leaders who sit on two or more corporate 
boards together frequently make similar campaign contributions, which does not necessarily 
mean that one corporation is influencing another corporation (Burris, 2005). This literature on 
the effects of various types of interlocks is large and complex, but there is no evidence in it that 
the members of bank boards per se have any unique role in the creation of the general public 
polices that are of concern to the fractured-elite and corporate-dominance theories.  
Moreover, the most systematic study of the political consciousness of corporate directors 
concluded that directors with multiple directorships are just as conservative, and maybe more 
conservative, than those who sit on only one corporate board: “Contrary to the hypotheses on 
inner-group consciousness, it is neither more uniform nor more liberal than that of other class 
members. Indeed, the core members of the inner group--the triple-director executives--hold a 
more conservative general ideology than peripheral members” (Useem, 1978, p. 234). Nor is 
there any evidence that tempers this conclusion in a book-length study of the role of multiple 
directors. It reports that such directors may have a “more developed and nuanced understanding 
of the political environment and how it is most productively influenced;” they also may be more 
willing to compromise, but this does not mean that their political consciousness is any less 
conservative (Useem, 1984, p. 111). Thus, they are perhaps better described as individuals who 
take the lead in adjusting corporate policy stances; they moved in a centrist direction in the face 
of the civil rights and anti-war movements, but in a more conservative direction in the 1970s.  As 
for any evidence that fits with the idea of greater moderation, it is linked to involvement in 
policy-discussion groups (Useem, 1984, p. 113). Thus, multiple directorships, whether they 
include membership on a bank board or not, may not matter as far as the dissemination of a 
moderate-conservative corporate perspective. What the multiple directors seem to share is the 
connections and visibility that make them more likely to become members of policy-discussion 
groups and receive appointments to government (Useem, 1980, 1984).  
 Over and beyond the issue of corporate interlocks and their impact, there is a bigger 
question: is the policy-planning network the source of the general policy positions that are 
adopted by members of the corporate community?  
 
Corporate Policy And The Policy-Planning Network 
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Due to the emphasis that the fractured-elite perspective puts on bank boards as the sites 
for their members to develop policy consensus, it places less emphasis on the policy-planning 
network than does corporate-dominance theory. True, it frequently mentions the Business 
Council, the Business Roundtable, the CED, and other policy-discussion venues, and discusses 
the breadth of vision and multiple directorships possessed by their leaders (e.g. Mizruchi, 2013, 
pp. 5, 36-38, 67-76, 234-238). However, these organizations are never linked into a network that 
includes numerous corporate directors and is funded by corporations and foundations, and that 
conveys its policy positions to government through testimony to Congress, lobbying, and the 
appointments of its leaders and advisors to government positions as cabinet officers or members 
of White House and departmental advisory committees (Domhoff, 2014b, Chapters 4 and 7).  In 
addition, the roles that corporate-dominance theory long ago attributed to the policy-discussion 
groups seem to have considerable overlap with the roles fractured-elite theory assigns to banks as 
“mediating mechanisms” (e.g., Domhoff, 1971, 1974; 1979, Chapter 3; Mizruchi, 2013, p. 131).  
Although the policy-planning network is a more likely site for general policy discussions 
than bank-board networks, the fractured-elite argument overlooks a way in which the CEOs and 
other corporate leaders who serve as bank directors may have differentially contributed to policy 
formation in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Forty-eight percent of the people who were trustees 
of two or more of 12 prominent organizations in the policy-planning network in 1980 were also 
directors of one of the ten largest banks, compared to 19 percent in 1973 and 33 percent in 1990 
(Burris, 1992, p. 128, Table 4). These results support the idea that corporate leaders who serve as 
bank directors may have had a special role in policy planning at an important juncture in the late 
1970s and early 1980s, but they more fully support corporate-dominance theory because that 
special role was played out in the policy-planning network, not the corporate network. These 
claims for the greater importance of the policy-planning network also have been supported by 
case studies mentioned in previous sections, and by other case studies that could have been 
mentioned for the Progressive Era (e.g., workmen’s compensation insurance and the creation of 
the Federal Trade Commission) (Castrovinci, 1976; Fishback & Kantor, 2000; Weinstein, 1968) 
and the New Deal (e.g., the formulation of the National Industrial Recovery Act and the 
Agricultural Adjustment Act) (Domhoff, 1996,  Chapter  4; Domhoff & Webber, 2011 Chapter 
2; Himmelberg, 1976/1993).  
The claims for the greater importance of the policy-planning network are further 
supported in the next section with evidence for its continuing importance from 1990 to 2010 on 
several major policy issues. This further evidence is especially critical because the fractured-elite 
analysis claims that bank boards were not sources of policy cohesion during this time period. 
Thus, a strong degree of policy unity, albeit with the usual conservative and ultraconservative 
tendencies still apparent, would show that the corporate community developed and conveyed its 
policy preferences through the policy-planning network during a period that fractured-elite 
theory sees as a time of increasing corporate fragmentation and ineffectiveness. 
 
 
Case-Study Evidence for Corporate-Moderate Unity and Effectiveness, 1990 to 2010 
 
According to fractured-elite theory, in the 1970s the “American corporate elite began to 
abandon its earlier commitment to a position of responsibility for the well being of the larger 
society, focusing instead on its own, short-term interests” (Mizruchi, 2013, p. 154). By the end of 
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the 1980s, “the three forces that had contributed to the moderation of the postwar corporate 
elite—the state, organized labor, and the financial community—were no longer playing this role” 
(Mizruchi, 2013, p. 197). As a result, the corporate elite was fragmented and ineffectual. 
The first problem with this claim is that the Business Roundtable supported a tax increase 
in 1990 that was difficult for President George H. W. Bush to accept because he had promised 
during the 1988 presidential campaign that he would not raise taxes. When he reluctantly agreed 
to raise the gas tax by a few cents, reduce the accelerated depreciation rate for corporations for 
three years, and raise the top marginal tax rate on individual incomes from 28 to 31 percent as 
part of a budget compromise with Congressional Democrats, ultraconservatives pilloried him. 
This episode is dealt with as follows in the fractured-elite account: “As late as 1990, then, even 
after the corporate elite had become weakened by the takeover wave it had faced during the 
1980s, corporate leaders were still calling for tax increases when they believed that the deficit 
had become uncomfortably large” (Mizruchi, 2013, p. 231). From a corporate-dominance 
perspective, this comment does not do justice to what happened.  The strong statement put forth 
by the Business Roundtable demonstrates that it remained able to come together despite the 
merger wave of the mid-1980s and the decline in bank centrality. It still could unify and deliver 
what proved to be a successful message. 
 According to the fractured-elite perspective, the fragmentation and irrelevance of the 
corporate elite was all but complete by the mid-1990s, by which time it had lost much of its 
ability “to generate either a consensus of ideas or a similarity of behavior” (Mizruchi, 2013, pp. 
197). This conclusion is contradicted by the successful uphill battle that a united corporate 
community carried out between 1991 and 1994 to pass the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA). This legislation was strongly opposed by the liberal-labor alliance, even 
though it had supported the expansion of free trade in past decades. In its view, “free trade” by 
this point was mostly about moving jobs to low-wage countries, which had replaced the South as 
the corporate community’s safe haven from unions.  
Detailed studies clearly demonstrate that the Business Roundtable led the way in creating 
the wide-ranging USA*NAFTA coalition of businesses, which appointed “captains” in 30 states 
to organize corporate leaders to visit Senators and members of the House (Cox, 2008; Dreiling, 
2001; Dreiling & Darves-Bornoz, 2015, pp. 195-208).  At the same time, the key corporate 
leaders on this issue, including many of the state captains, were members of official trade 
advisory committees housed within the Department of Commerce. In addition, statistical 
analyses showed that several company-level organizational factors, such as size, business sector, 
and number of foreign subsidiaries, had an impact on a corporation’s degree of involvement in 
the issue. However, being part of the policy-planning network had an impact that was 
independent of the organizational level of analysis: “When controlling for foreign subsidiaries, 
PAC contributions, and labor intensity, [Dreiling, 2001] found that network variables remained 
statistically significant and explained greater variation in the odds of leadership than did the 
organizational interests measures” (Dreiling & Darves-Bornoz, 2015, p. 73 and Chapter 5). For 
example, involvement in the policy-planning network increased the likelihood that a corporate 
leader would testify before Congress in favor of the expansion of trade.  
This quantitative finding is complemented by a detailed account of the individuals, 
corporations, and policy organizations that introduced and supported the legislation (Dreiling, 
2001; Dreiling & Darves-Bornoz, 2015, Chapter 4). It is also supported by an interview-based 
case study of the issue by the publisher-editor of Harper’s Magazine, who gave his book the 
incendiary title, The Selling of ‘Free Trade:’ NAFTA, Washington, and the Subversion of 
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American Democracy (MacArthur, 2000), to highlight the lengths to which the corporate leaders 
went to pass the legislation. The bill eventually passed because most Republicans and the 
remaining white Southern Democrats voted together in one of the last hurrahs for the 
conservative coalition before the Republicans finished their takeover of most Southern 
congressional seats in the next few years (CQ, 1996). It was a clear victory over the liberal-labor 
alliance.  
Instead of facing the challenge presented by the findings on NAFTA, the fractured-elite 
argument discusses the failed Clinton health-care plan. According to its analysis, the reform lost 
for many reasons, including the all-out opposition of ultraconservatives and small business, but 
the weakness of the corporate elite was crucial: “Ultimately, however, what prevented 
constructive reform from occurring was the ineffectuality of the corporate elite” (Mizruchi, 2013, 
p. 252). But the corporate moderates were not ineffectual; they were not fully focused on the 
issues at the outset and were already headed in another direction. Based on her work as a 
consultant to the White House Health Care Task Force, as well as “the many discussions and 
presentations I made to business leaders from June 1993 through December 1994,” sociologist 
Linda Bergthold (1995, p. 2, ftn 2) provides an alternative analysis that builds on her earlier 
theoretical work on health issues as well as her direct observations (Bergthold, 1990).  
Although there were self-interested divisions between companies that would save money 
through the reforms in financing health care and those that would end up paying more, even most 
of the businesses that stood to benefit ended up opposing an employer mandate. This anti-reform 
unity was based at least in part “on the grounds of ideological opposition to government 
mandates of any kind” (Bergthold, 1995, p. 9), as the fractured-elite account also concludes 
(Mizruchi, 2013, pp. 249, 251). But there were power issues at stake as well. For the corporate 
community in general, there were “tensions between the economic self-interest of firms (e.g., 
wouldn’t it be cheaper to simply pay for but not manage health benefits?) and the fear of loss of 
control over benefits to government [that] could not be resolved,” and the ultraconservatives 
were resolutely opposed under any circumstances (Bergthold, 1995, p. 12). Moreover, the 
Clinton plan in effect eliminated a substantial number of the positions held by the human 
resources directors and the benefits managers who were advising their CEOs.  
Just as important at that juncture, the corporate moderates were mostly concerned with 
restructuring the health-care delivery system. On this issue “reform of the marketplace [for 
health care] was proceeding headlong before Clinton focused the national spotlight on health 
reform,” and it proceeded even faster while the Clinton plan was being discussed (Bergthold, 
1995, p. 10, my italics).  As a result, and as acknowledged in the fractured-elite account, health-
care costs were leveling off in 1993 and remained flat as a percentage of GDP until 1998 
(Mizruchi, 2013, p. 256). Thus, the corporate moderates felt no great urgency in 1994 to enact a 
plan about which most of them had qualms.  
Based on this analysis, it seems unlikely that corporate moderates would have gone along 
with health care reform, even if they had been consulted as to their preferences on key issues 
before the plan was developed (which they weren’t) and even if they had been treated 
respectfully by the executive director of the White House Task Force when they were able to 
meet with him at their own request (which they weren’t) (Bergthold, 1995, pp. 6, 14). As 
Bergthold (1995, p. 1) puts it, “we should never have expected any public support for reform 
from business anyway.”  Another sociologist, Beth Mintz (1998), comes to a very similar 
conclusion. She takes exception with those who claim the large corporations were divided, or 
dominated by the views of major insurance companies, both of which are considered to be 
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factors in the fractured-elite analysis (Mizruchi, 2013, pp. 251-252). Instead, she concludes “The 
defection of big business can be viewed as a unified action, based not on the ability of a narrow, 
self-interested segment to dominate the decision-making process, but on the uncertainty that the 
Clinton proposal generated for the big business community” (Mintz, 1998, p. 217). Even more 
strongly, sociologist Jill Quadagno (2005, p. 192), building on the wider range of studies and 
original sources that were available 10 years after the Clinton initiative failed, concludes “it had 
lost the support of all major business groups” by as early as mid-fall 1993, including the 
Business Roundtable, the Chamber of Commerce, and the NAM.  
As part of the claim that the corporate moderates were ineffective in dealing with the 
Clinton health-care plan, the fractured-elite perspective contrasts the supposed lack of unity 
within the Business Roundtable with the unity displayed by small business, as manifested in the 
form of the National Federation of Independent Business (NFIB) (Mizruchi, 2013, p 252). But 
such a claim overlooks, and therefore never confronts, the evidence that the NFIB is an 
ultraconservative lobbying organization, closely tied to the Republican Party. Furthermore, it 
meets none of the qualifications for being any sort of business or trade association (Domhoff, 
1990, pp. 268-269; 2013, p. 224). It actually began as a small business itself, established in 
Northern California in 1943 by a former Chamber of Commerce employee. The founder was in 
effect a political entrepreneur who made profits on membership fees while lobbying for his 
conservative policy preferences (Zeigler, 1961, pp. 31-32). The NFIB’s small-business members 
were (from at least the 1940s through the 1990s) signed up by traveling sales representatives 
who worked on a commission basis. Unlike voluntary business associations, there were no 
general meetings or votes for officers (and still aren’t), and membership turnover is large each 
year.  
Business owners that join the NFIB receive membership stickers for their store windows, 
a newsletter with suggestions for small businesses, and periodic surveys on a wide range of 
issues. The surveys are slanted to evoke conservative responses, the results of which are 
compiled at state and national headquarters and mailed to state and national legislators as 
“mandates” from small-business owners. Comparisons of the results of these surveys, which 
typically are returned by only about 20 percent of the members, with those from national surveys 
suggest that the ultraconservative claims made on the basis of the mandates are not 
representative of small business owners, who mostly share the attitudes of their ethnic group 
and/or local community (Hamilton, 1975, Chapters 2 and 7). As a more recent analysis 
confirmed, surveys of small-business owners show that NFIB’s opposition to any government 
intervention in the marketplace is not consistent with the opinions of many small-business 
owners (Kazee, Lipsky, & Martin, 2008). 
The NFIB switched to a nonprofit status in the late 1960s, with another former Chamber 
of Commerce employee as its new president (White, 1983). Located in Virginia since 1992, by 
that time the NFIB had 700 employees and annual revenues of over $58 million (Domhoff, 1995, 
p. 6). NFIB files obtained by the Democratic National Committee support the earlier claim that 
the NFIB is very selective in making assertions to Congress about what small-business owners 
prefer in terms of policy. In the July/August 1995, issue of its magazine, Independent Business, it 
reported that 85 percent of its members opposed employer-mandated health care in 1993; 
however, it never publicized the fact that its July 1989, survey found that 60 percent of its 
respondents agreed that “government must play a more direct role in health care to bring health-
care costs under control” (Domhoff, 1995, p. 8). Information provided as part of the fractured-
elite analysis of the health-care issue also supports the claim that the NFIB presented an 
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inaccurate picture of what small-business owners believed and wanted in the early stages of the 
battle over the Clinton reform plan. It reports that a Dun & Bradstreet survey found “there was a 
virtual tie among small companies in the extent to which they favored ‘national health 
insurance,’ with 38 percent saying yes, 39 percent saying no, and 23 percent responding ‘don’t 
know’” (Mizruchi, 2013, p. 246).   
One pair of political scientists reported that in the 1990s the NFIB was the organized 
interest group that “has the closest working relationship with the Republican leadership in 
Congress today,” and then presented its staff links to the Republicans (Shaiko & Wallace, 1999, 
pp. 21, 25-26). But a survey of small-business owners with 100 or fewer employees in 2008 
reported that one-third were Republicans, one-third Democrats, and 29 percent neither 
(Mandelbaum, 2009).  Nevertheless, the NFIB gave 90 percent of its campaign donations to 
Republicans between 1989 and 2008; even here, the analysis does not go far enough because it 
did not determine if the rest of the money went to the dwindling number of ultraconservative 
white Southern Democrats that lingered in Congress into the late 1990s (Mandelbaum, 2009). 
The evidence is clear that the NFIB represents the ultraconservatives among small-business 
owners, which creates a problem for the fractured-elite claim about the unity of small business 
on government health insurance, or any other issue. 
 Health-care aside, the fractured-elite evidence for the supposed ineffectiveness of the 
corporate moderates does not include any legislative issues for the rest of the 1990s. Instead, the 
argument is based on the low visibility of the CED and the alleged ineffectiveness of the 
Business Roundtable in lobbying Congress. In the case of the CED, the fractured-elite account 
points to commentary in the Congressional Record in 1997, which simply demonstrates that 
many members of Congress did not know anything about the CED at that time (Mizruchi, 2013, 
pp. 253-254). This fact is irrelevant because it already had been established in an account cited in 
the fractured-elite book that the CED was in decline by 1976 and had become at best a source of 
long-range policy suggestions for the Business Roundtable by 1978 (Domhoff, 2006b, p. 99). As 
the president of the CED in the late 1970s later succinctly put it in a telephone interview, the 
CED chair and his corporate colleagues had created a “niche” for CED between the Business 
Roundtable and the American Enterprise Institute (Domhoff, 2013, p. 233; Holland, 1992). If the 
CED had been relegated to a niche by 1978, it cannot come as news, or as evidence of anything, 
that it was unknown to many members of Congress 20 years later. (In early 2015, the CED 
became a quasi-independent policy center within the much bigger and older Conference Board; it 
is now named “The Committee for Economic Development of the Conference Board.”)  
 To demonstrate the alleged ineffectiveness of the Business Roundtable in the late 1990s, 
the fractured-elite theory relies on a Fortune article entitled “The Fallen Giant.” The article is 
based on a Fortune poll of about 2,200 “Washington insiders,” who were asked to rank the most 
powerful business lobbies in Washington. The Business Roundtable ranked 33rd, well below the 
American Trucking Association, the National Retail Federation, the NFIB, the NAM, and the 
Chamber of Commerce (Mizruchi, 2013, p. 254). Aside from the fact that the Business 
Roundtable usually is not perceived as a lobbying organization, and is not classified as such by 
corporate-dominance theory, it is not at all evident that the votes of 2,200 Washington observers 
of unknown reliability and access should be taken seriously as to the power of an organization.  
 At that time, moreover, the Business Roundtable had organized an American Leads on 
Trade coalition (ALOT) to convince Congress to renew the president’s “fast track” authority for 
negotiating new agreements to expand trade with other countries. This successful coalition then 
became the basis for the even larger corporate coalition USA*ENGAGE, which led a successful 
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corporate lobbying effort to grant China the status called Permanent National Trade Relations. 
This status removed any constraint on the Chinese dictatorship’s internal and external policies 
that might have been created by the need for a yearly renewal of normal trade relations. It also 
removed any corporate hesitation in off-shoring production to China. Well after the status was 
granted, some economists estimated that the agreement led to the loss of over two million 
manufacturing jobs in the United States during its first seven years (Dreiling & Darves-Bornoz, 
2015, p. 255).  
As in the case of the NAFTA legislation, sociologists Michael Dreiling and Derek 
Darves-Bornoz (2015) carried out detailed quantitative studies to compare the relative strength of 
several variables in predicting corporate involvement. This time, however, their analyses 
employed a dyadic method, quadratic assignment procedure, which is better at assessing the 
strength of relationships than other methods. These studies once again found that organizational-
level variables, such as company size and large PAC donations, predicted greater involvement in 
temporary trade alliances, testimony before Congress, and participation in governmental trade 
advisory committees. But being part of the policy-planning network had a larger impact in terms 
of involvement in all three outcome variables, especially if a corporate dyad shared membership 
in the Business Roundtable (Dreiling & Darves, 2011; Dreiling & Darves-Bornoz, 2015, pp. 
275-276) 
This network-based evidence is supplemented by information in a detailed report by a 
public-interest watchdog group, Public Citizen, on the legislative battle itself. The report focused 
on campaign donations and lobbying by members of the corporate coalition (Woodall, Wallach, 
Roach, & Burnham, 2000). For example, members of the Business Roundtable alone “made 
$68.2 million in PAC, soft money and individual donations to Members of Congress and the 
Democratic and Republican parties between January 1999 and May 2000,” the month in which 
the Congressional vote was held, much of it aimed at 71 swing districts that likely would be 
crucial in securing the legislation (Woodall, et al., 2000, p. iii). These representatives were 
alternately threatened with reprisals by named and unnamed sources in the business press and 
offered help with campaign finances by means of fundraising receptions (Dreiling & Darves-
Bornoz, 2015, pp. 292-293). By comparison, organized labor raised $31 million overall for the 
campaign.  
Instead of considering the effort to grant the status of permanent national trade 
relationship to China, the fractured-elite perspective focuses on what it sees as another sign of 
weakness for the Business Roundtable. It did not call for a tax hike in 2003 despite the fact that 
“the deficit quickly reached record levels” due to the Bush tax cuts of 2001 and the wars in 
Afghanistan and Iraq (Mizruchi, 2013, p. 233). The fractured-elite critique calls the 
organization’s silence on the issue  “an illustration of the extent to which the group was 
unwilling to take a potentially unpopular position” (Mizruchi, 2013, p. 232).  However, this 
critique does not focus on a more basic fact in terms of the theory’s emphasis on 
fragmentation—the corporate leaders, ranging from the Business Roundtable to the NAM to the 
Chamber of Commerce, were united in supporting the tax cuts in 2001 and continued to be 
supportive of them over the next several years (Mizruchi, 2013, pp. 235-236). This unity may be 
a sign of shortsightedness, or even due to mere “loyalty to the president,” but neither possibility 
is evidence that the corporate community was fractured on a tax issue any more than it was 
fractured on the issue of trade with China (Mizruchi, 2013, p. 234). 
Furthermore, it is questionable that the corporate moderates should have called for a tax 
increase in 2003 in light of events in the 1990s and the state of the economy in the first several 
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years of the twenty-first century.  After all, the disappearance of budget deficits in the late 1990s 
revealed that the concern with large deficits and a growing federal debt missed the economic 
mark. The deficit fell very rapidly in the Clinton era primarily due to the stock-market boom. As 
a result, there were government projections that the federal debt would be gone within a decade, 
an unlikely possibility just a few years before (Baker, 2007, p. 169). This news gave presidential 
candidate George W. Bush the opportunity to call for tax cuts for all Americans. The proposal 
for a tax cut was supported in Congressional testimony by the chair of the Federal Reserve 
Board, who warned that the disappearance of the debt might make it more difficult for the Fed to 
influence interest rates through the purchase or sale of Treasury bonds; he also raised the specter 
that the government might be “forced to buy up private assets, such as corporate bonds or shares 
of stock” in order to earn interest on the looming surplus (Baker, 2007, p. 169).  
By the time the tax cuts were starting to take effect, there was yet another reason to let 
the deficit and the debt grow again: the sharp decline in the economy after the stock-market 
boom collapsed.  In that regard, the fractured-elite view notes that there were reasonable 
objections to focusing on the deficit at that moment, and that the concern with deficit reduction 
might be ideological in any case (Mizruchi, 2013, pp. 233). It also notes that Republicans who 
expressed no concern about the deficit in 2003 did an “about-face once Barack Obama took 
office,” which suggests that the antipathy was to spending tax dollars on what the power elite 
saw as the wrong kind of government spending (Mizruchi, 2013, p. 233). Nevertheless, the fact 
that the Business Roundtable did not call for a tax hike is described in the fractured-elite account 
as “a retreat from responsibility on the issue of taxes,” a retreat that is “emblematic of the decline 
of the American corporate elite” (Mizruchi, 2013, p. 238). Based on this brief summary of the 
booms and busts of the economy between 1994 and 2004, it is difficult for corporate-dominance 
theory to give credibility to the idea that the decision by the Business Roundtable not to call for a 
tax increase in 2003 or 2004 demonstrates fragmentation or an inability to rise above the narrow 
interests of the corporations.  
The corporate community also demonstrated complete unity in 2008 when it organized a 
multimillion-dollar campaign of lobbying and media advertising in anticipation of a 
Congressional vote in 2009 on the Employee Free Choice Act. If the act had passed, it would 
have given union organizers the right to by-pass representation elections (which corporate 
officials often successfully delay for many months at a time) if a majority of a company’s 
employees signed a card stating that they wanted to join the union. Working through lobbying 
coalitions, the corporate leaders argued that the legislation would take away workers’ right to 
vote for or against unionization in a secret ballot. The bill never came to a vote because 41 
Republican senators said they would support a filibuster, and three Democrats indicated they 
would not support the bill (Domhoff, 2014b, p. 184).  
 
The Affordable Care Act 
  
By 2007 the moderate conservatives were strong and united supporters of the basic tenets 
that were incorporated into the Affordable Care Act (ACA). The Act passed in 2010 despite the 
opposition of the Chamber of Commerce and the ultraconservative front group called the 
National Federation of Independent Business. The corporate moderates supported this legislation 
in principle because it was based on an individual mandate, an employer mandate, and maximum 
use of private-sector health insurance. All of these features were part of a proposal in 1993 by 
moderate Republicans in the Senate that was offered as an alternative to the Clinton Plan. As 
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Quadagno (2014, p. 35) concluded after detailed research,  “The ACA’s key provisions, the 
employer mandate and the individual mandate, were Republican policy ideas, and its 
fundamental principles were nearly identical to the Health Equity and Access Reform Today Act 
of 1993 (HEART), a bill promoted by Republican senators to deflect support for President Bill 
Clinton’s Health Security plan.”  
Corporate moderates first supported these three principles in the early 1970s, as seen in a 
report by the CED (1973), but they had been wary of the employer mandate in the context of the 
Clinton reform plan.  As to the issue of an individual mandate, it had been offered anew by the 
ultraconservative Heritage Foundation in 1989, and accepted by most ultraconservatives in the 
1990s, but by the early 2000’s they were opposed. As for the corporate community of the 
twenty-first century, leaders within it began in 2007 to advocate for the individual mandate and 
the other two key provisions in the 1993 Republican proposal as a necessary part of the kind of 
health-care reform it was willing to support.  
In February 2007, several major corporations joined with AARP and the Service 
Employees International Union (SEIU) to form a coalition for health-care reform (Cohn, 2007; 
Mizruchi, 2013, p. 256). In May 2007, the CEO of Safeway organized the Coalition to Advance 
Health Care Reform, which included 36 other companies (Nizza, 2007). The Business 
Roundtable (2007) endorsed the individual mandate a month later and said that it is the 
responsibility of all Americans to obtain insurance. The same year, the national trade 
organization for the medical devices industry came out for the individual mandate (McDonough, 
2011, pp. 53-54). 
 As part of the process of developing its health-care plan, the Obama Administration 
negotiated a deal in August 2009, with the prescription drug industry, which was represented by 
its trade association, PhRMA. The large pharmaceutical companies agree to provide discounts of 
$80 billion over a ten-year period for Medicare recipients in exchange for the greatly expanded 
market for their medications that would be created. The pharmaceutical companies then spent an 
estimated $150 million in lobbying and media coverage in support of the legislation (Kirkpatrick, 
2009; Mizruchi, 2013, p. 257). 
Despite the Obama Administration’s efforts to accommodate the corporate moderates on 
all their major concerns, a coalition of health insurance companies, America’s Health Insurance 
Plans, which stated its support for an individual mandate shortly after Obama’s election, ended 
up lobbying against the plan. This opposition developed because of liberal and labor support for 
a new provision, “the public option,” which would have made it possible for the government to 
offer insurance programs in competition with the private sector.   The insurance industry made 
clear that it would fiercely oppose the legislation if it included the public option, and the idea 
was dropped late in the process (McDonough, 2011, pp. 55, 169-170; Quadagno, 2011). As a 
result, liberals and organized labor, which originally strongly favored a single-payer system, did 
not work hard to pass the bill, with the exception of the SEIU.  
 Fractured-elite theory provides a similar account of the health-insurance initiatives by the 
Business Roundtable, AARP, and the SEIU in 2007 and 2008, and further notes that 
representatives from the Business Roundtable and other business groups met shortly after the 
2008 elections. They emerged from their discussion with the conclusion that “the possibility of 
change was far greater at this point than during the Clinton Administration” (Mizruchi, 2013, p. 
257).  The fractured-elite analysis then states that the corporate elite was “involved in all stages 
of the process” that led to the ACA (Mizruchi, 2013, p. 258). But it ends with the unexpected 
conclusion that the corporate elite’s role “was far less central than it had been during the debate 
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of the Clinton plan,” and that “the corporate elite essentially sat on the sidelines” (Mizruchi, 
2013, p. 258).  Whatever the merits of this puzzling claim may prove to be when new archival 
evidence is examined in detail, the facts remain that (1) the act was based on principles that were 
created and insisted upon by the moderate conservatives in the corporate community; (2) these 
corporate moderates called for health-insurance reform in the run-up to the 2008 election; (3) 
corporate moderates were involved in the legislative process; and (4) corporate moderates did 
not try to block the bill.  The success of the ACA, in conjunction with the failure of the Clinton 
health-care plan in 1994, which the corporate moderates opposed, provides strong evidence 
against the hypothesis that the corporate moderates were fragmented and ineffectual on the 
health-care issue when they could support a plan that was acceptable to all corporate moderates.   
More generally, every piece of legislation discussed in this section for the years 1990 to 
2010 contradicts the idea that the corporate moderates became increasingly fragmented and 
ineffectual in the late 1980s. Although corporate-level networks have changed in some ways 
during the past several decades, the core of the corporate moderates’ policy-planning network 
has been stable since the early 1970s (Burris, 1992, 2008; Domhoff, 1979, Chapter 3; Dreiling & 
Darves-Bornoz, 2015, p. 75-77). 
 
Conclusion 
 
 From a corporate-dominance vantage point, the fractured-elite analysis is based on a 
questionable historical analysis, a failure to take seriously the network and case-study evidence 
for the importance of the overall policy-planning network, a selective and poorly presented 
handful of brief commentaries related to domestic public policy between 1990 and 2010, and an 
over-reliance on opinion surveys, journalistic accounts, and changes in the interlock patterns 
within corporate networks over a twenty-year period.  Since it is certain that the power elite 
completely opposes unions, actively works to hold down wages through a variety of stratagems, 
and fights for decreases in the progressivity of income taxes, it is difficult to imagine that the 
ongoing decline in union density since 1954, the stagnation of average real wages since the 
1970s, the general decline since the 1960s in taxes on the corporate rich and their corporations, 
and the defeat of several legislative initiatives put forth by an increasingly hobbled liberal-labor 
alliance could have happened without the power elite’s united and ongoing efforts. 
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